Noncontiguity and political architecture: the parliaments of small island states

Territorial noncontiguity creates distance problems, and thereby promotes a need for noncontiguous countries to accommodate regional or otherwise distinct interests that emanate from or are linked to territorial divisions. For a population of 31 small island states, many of which display territorial noncontiguity, this study explores to what extent geography is reflected in the political architecture of legislatures that these political units choose to apply. Specifically, the study searches for possible effects of noncontiguity on federalism and bicameralism as well as the extent to which parliaments are recruited by means of apportionment and appointment. Concerning federalism and bicameralism, no discernible patterns emerge. Concerning apportionment and appointment, however, noncontiguity makes a difference. These techniques are used by a majority of the noncontiguous island states, but not (Mauritius being by virtue of its social heterogeneity a distinct exception) by contiguous island states. Processes of constitution-making in the island states have indeed been concerned with challenges that originate from the partitioning of space, and although geography does not of course explain the totality of politics, it does affect, to some extent at least, the motives, inducements, calculations and behaviour of constitution-makers as political architects.