| 博弈论视角下的卢沟桥事变 |
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| 引用本文： | 张守刚,张生. 博弈论视角下的卢沟桥事变[J]. 安徽史学, 2004, 0(3): 52-57 |
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| 作者姓名： | 张守刚 张生 |
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| 作者单位： | 南京大学,历史系,江苏,南京,210093 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文主要运用博弈论模型对卢沟桥事变从一个"地方性"事件演变为中日两国之间的全面战争这一过程进行分析.本文认为,卢沟桥事变发生伊始,中日两国都不同程度地想避免卷入全面战争,但是由于双方在卢沟桥事变后所采取的对策使得他们陷入了"谁是懦夫"的困境中,最终导致了全面战争的爆发.
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| 关 键 词： | 博弈论 卢沟桥事变 " 谁是懦夫" 模型 |
| 文章编号： | 1005-605X(2004)03-0052-06 |
Lugou Bridge Incident in the perpective of Game Theory |
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| ZHANG Shou-gang ZHANG Sheng. Lugou Bridge Incident in the perpective of Game Theory[J]. Historiography Anhui, 2004, 0(3): 52-57 |
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| Authors: | ZHANG Shou-gang ZHANG Sheng |
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| Abstract: | The essay mainly analyzed the course of the incident from an endemic incident to a full-scale war between China and Japan with the model of Game Theory.It is believed in this essay that at the beginning,both China and Japan wanted to avoid a full-scale war to different extents.Nevertheless,the policies of the two nations made themselves fall into the dilemma of the"Chicken Game",which leads to full-scale war at last. |
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| Keywords: | Game Theory Lugou Bridge Incident Chicken Game |
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