Neglect,Inattention, and Legislative Deficiencies: The Consequences of One-Party Deliberations in The U.S. House |
| |
Authors: | William Bendix |
| |
Affiliation: | Department of Economics and Political Science, Keene State College, Keene, New Hampshire |
| |
Abstract: | Congressional scholars have conducted little research on the consequences of the majority party controlling bill formulation and excluding minority members from the legislative process. Critics of one-party deliberations use case-study evidence to argue that such processes lead to error-prone, often defective legislation. However, no large-N analysis has sought to operationalize and verify this effect. I develop new empirical strategies to explore claims about the relationship between deliberative procedures and policy outcomes. Examining legislation drafted in the U.S. House between 1987 and 2008, I find suggestive but consistent evidence of error-prone bills being developed under one-party processes. |
| |
Keywords: | |
|
|