Studying Rules Changes in the U.S. House: Evidence from an Alternative Empirical Model

Binder (1996) and Schickler (2000) define the current debate as to why the U.S. House has changed its standing rules regarding the majority rule and the minority rights. I revisit their empirical models—binary logit and ordered logit—and theoretically and statistically test the appropriateness of these models. I find that both of them are actually choosing inappropriate models. Their theoretical claims cannot be properly examined by utilizing their choices of models. In addition, the data do not satisfy the “parallel regression” assumption but do satisfy the “independence of irrelevant alternatives” assumption, which supports using an alternative multinomial logit model. I further extend the model, and find the dynamic nature of rules changes in the U.S. House. It appears there is no symmetry between the rules changes that promote the majority rule and the rules changes that enhance the minority rights.