| Abstract: | In October 2001, the prime minister of Britain, Tony Blair, identified the destruction of the narcotics industry as a subsidiary but nevertheless major objective during the intervention in Afghanistan. Within 18 months of the intervention, the UK had launched a policy to compensate farmers for destroying their opium crops, assumed the role of G8 lead nation for counter narcotics and set an ambitious target to destroy opium cultivation within 10 years. However, other than the rather dismal results of British counter narcotics policy, very little is known about the decision-making processes that underpinned them. This article provides unique insight into British counter narcotics policy-making during 2001–2003, with a focus on the interdepartmental discussions regarding policy formulation. It reveals that Whitehall was divided over involvement in such a complex task, with officials close to the prime minister arguing that this was an achievable task and those within the Foreign and Commonwealth Office arguing that the policies adopted were doomed to failure. This article demonstrates just how and why the failure predicted by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office actually came about. |
