| Abstract: | Had the Munich Agreement not forestalled it, the Second World War, or at least a European war, would have begun in 1938. According to arguments in defence of appeasement, Neville Chamberlain and Edouard Daladier bought time and avoided embroiling their countries in a conflict for which they were not prepared. The abundant historiography on Munich, nevertheless, continues to lack a complete picture of the balance of forces at the time. This article seeks to establish which side in the looming conflict was actually best positioned. It examines the likely line-up of belligerents, their respective land, sea and air forces and their war plans and strategies. The French and Czechoslovak armies were a more than even match for the Wehrmacht, it argues. An analysis of the German, Czechoslovak and French plans shows that Hitler's projected offensive was a hazardous enterprise that risked becoming bogged down and opening the Reich to a multi-sided invasion. Czechoslovak army strength and defensive capabilities, too often ignored or glossed over, weighed the scales down materially against German success. This was without even counting, finally, on the potential contributions of Britain and the Soviet Union on the allied side. |
