| Abstract: | With a focus on Melanesia, game theory is used to model the logical structure of strategic interactions between actors who engage in exchange transactions and to identify paradoxes, opportunities and uncertainties that confront those actors. It is argued that these exchanges are of three types which are named sharing, barter‐trade and prestige‐service. The first has the form of the classic game known as Prisoner's Dilemma and the expectation of non‐cooperation inherent in this game is resolved by trust. The second has the form of a game known as Chicken and the high risk inherent in this game is resolved by social manipulations that transform the payoff structure into Prisoner's Dilemma. The third is always an n‐person game. It has the form of a prestige game with an unconventional logical structure that is contingent on the existence of a parallel set of service games, each having the form of Chicken. The paper concludes by attempting to restore some realism to models that were over‐simplified abstractions. Some reinterpretations of conventional understandings are suggested. |
