Allocating blame: dissecting the Coalition's failures in Iraq |
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| Authors: | ANDREW RATHMELL |
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| Affiliation: | Director of RAND Europe's Defence and Security Programme. He manages work for European and US clients on defence and internal security policy, including post-conflict reconstruction, Middle East security, terrorism, critical infrastructure protection and defence policy and programmes. In 2003 and 2004, he served as director of policy planning for the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad where he was responsible for the CPA's strategic plan for the security and development of Iraq. His publications include 'Planning post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq: what can we learn?', International Affairs;81: 5, 2005. |
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| Abstract: | A number of books by former Coalition officials are now emerging that provide detailed insights into aspects of US and UK policy-making before and during the occupation of Iraq. Two of these books lay the blame for the failure to stabilize rapidly the country and to ensure a peaceful process of political transition squarely on the shoulders of the Bush administration, the Department of Defense and the Coalition Provisional Authority. Many of the criticisms of prewar and occupation policy-making and implementation are valued, if not new. The real benefit of these accounts is that they provide snapshots of fragments of the Iraq story; they do not, however, provide the broader picture that is required to understand the current situation in Iraq. Furthermore, they fail to provide useful advice as to how the situation can now be improved. |
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