| Abstract: | Abstract The third parliamentary Bicameral Committee established to reform the Italian constitution conducted its business from January to June 1997. The results have been controversial and have attracted a great deal of criticism. The Committee's recommendations are subject to amendment by parliament and must then be approved (or rejected) in a general referendum. The Committee ended up recommending what is essentially a French‐style semi‐presidential system. It is accompanied by an electoral law that offers a premium of an additional 20 per cent of the seats to the majority, 55 per cent to be elected in simple majority electoral districts, and 25 per cent to be distributed nationally on a proportional basis. PDS leader Massimo D'Alema, chair of the Committee, has claimed victory since the Commitee produced a positive outcome, yet in fact he has certainly lost since he preferred a strong ‘premier’ model and a majority runoff electoral system. The Committee demonstrated that small parties, especially the former Christian Democrats, can exert influence over larger ones, that the parries retain firm control over the process of institutional reform, that the three major party leaders — D'Alema, Berlusconi and Fini — preferred their own reciprocal legitimization over the attainment of any major reform, and that Italy's political‐institutional transition is not yet over. Indeed, the proposed reforms are likely to prove neither sufficient nor adequate. |
