| Abstract: | Although imperial historians concentrate on regions and periods with abundant documentation, it is worth considering how another discipline copes with the political fate of post-colonial societies whose records are not so easily accessible. The nine works reviewed below cover problems of misgovernment in new states in several regions. This article concentrates on their methods and conclusions for states in sub-Saharan Africa and more especially West Africa. Authors and editors have made considerable use of patron-client (or clientelistic) explanations in their interpretations of the aims and performance of African leaders under post-independence constitutions. Techniques of patronage have a long history; colonial rulers applied them to find useful intermediaries between administrators and African ethnic groups; and there is ample evidence for their existence in the politics of new states under the label of ‘corruption’. Despite accepted definitions of patronage, the terminology of clientelism contains ambiguities when employed to denote historical cases in a large number of cultural contexts with poor economic management and dictatorial governance. The collective conclusion of the books reviewed charges African civil and military leaders with corruption in appropriation of public resources for private gains. All the authors comment on that generic term; one of them supplies a detailed analysis of its ramifications. Most have drawn, too, on imperial works and records as background to their explanation for the policies of civil and military leaders in independent states in coping with debt management, risk of territorial fragmentation, use of parastatals and misuse of resources. It is concluded here, however, that input from the late colonial period has been misunderstood; second, that anthropologists’ knowledge of the institution of chieftainship, its survival or disappearance, throws light on the ‘indeterminacy’ of leadership succession in Africa, unless overcome by the mechanisms of constitutional elections; and, third, that political science has not investigated the reasons for the lack of competent judicial and civil service institutions to safeguard the working of Africa's constitutions. |
