| Abstract: | This article examines strategic elements of voter behaviour in parliamentary elections where the voting method is a scoring rule other than plurality: the Borda Count, which is used for the election of ethnic minorities in Slovenia, and the Dowdall rule, which is used in the Pacific island state of Nauru in multi-seat districts. After first examining the general properties of scoring rules, and generating theoretical differences between the two rules, we look at empirical evidence from Nauru and Slovenia. This casts a doubt on predictions based simply on a voting rule's mathematical properties and on the accuracy of assumptions of sincere rank ordering. 本文研究了议会选举投票者行为的策略因素。议会选举中的投票方法是一个有别于多数法的计分法则：斯洛文尼亚少数族群选举使用的波达计数法;太平洋岛屿国家瑙鲁多席位选区使用的斗多尔法则。作者首先分析了计分法则的一般属性,并对两种法则做了理论区分。然后研究了瑙鲁和斯洛文尼亚的实证资料。作者对仅仅基于投票规则数学属性的预测以及有关纯粹排行假设的精确性表示了质疑。 |
