首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
   检索      


Between Autonomy and Capture
Authors:John Echeverri-Gent
Institution:John Echeverri-Gent;is an assistant professor in the Department of Government Foreign Affairs at the University of Virgiana. His research interests are in political economy, organization theory, and comparative public policy. He is co-editor of Economic Reform in Three Giants: U.S. Foreign Policy and the USSR, China and India (Transaction Books, 1990) and author of The State and The Poor: Comparing Pro-Poor Policies in India and the United States (University of California Press, forthcoming.)
Abstract:This article uses organization theory and political economy to develop a conceptual framework, for analyzing factors that shape relations between government agencies and their social environment. The framework conceptualizes these relations as social networks composed of actors engaged in the exchange of resources. Then, it develops an understanding of how cultural norms shape these exchanges. The article concludes by examining the framework's normative implications. In particular, it explores when agency autonomy promotes effective policy implementation and when it results in unaccountability. It also demonstrates that, in many cases, an agency's dependence on actors in its environment may enhance the effectiveness of policy implementation.
Keywords:
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号