| Abstract: | Since the demise of the Soviet Union the newly independent states (NIS) have attempted the wholesale reform of their economic, political, and social institutions. With varying levels of success they have sought to create new institutions or reorganize old institutions, often so as to mirror similar institutions in western Europe and North America. Many nations and international organizations have sought to influence these transitions with technical assistance, foreign aid, concessional loans, and trade/investment promotion programs. In this article we attempt to bridge the conceptual, analytic, and empirical gaps between those who argue that external influences remain unimportant and those who believe that international organizations and foreign governments can support reforms. Specifically, we argue that although external assistance can play a positive role in the successful consolidation of political and economic reforms, the contribution of external assistance to the post-Soviet transitions has been limited by the institutional arrangements, technical proficiency, and political motivations of the aid providers. We thus analyze patterns of foreign assistance to demonstrate that implicit conditionalities imposed by aid donors upon recipient countries—with regard to geographic distribution, program priorities, timing, and graduation criteria—often force recipients to comply with reform agendas that may or may not be favorable for the recipient. |
