The Congressional Committee Intelligence System: Information,Oversight, and Change |
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Authors: | Joel D Aberbach |
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Institution: | University of California, The University of Michigan , Los Angeles |
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Abstract: | Data from a study of top staffers on congressional committees indicate that Congress is rich in sources of information about the executive branch, and that it exploits these sources surprisingly well. An observer of the contemporary Congress can read Max Weber's classic essay on "bureaucracy" with minimum alarm. Weber's bureaucracy had an "overtowering" position relative to its nominal political masters because of its continuity, expertise, and ability to guard information (secrecy). U.S. congressional committees have built a formidable counter organization. Committee staffers are not mere "dilettantes" who stand opposite administrative "experts." They have a significant level of experience in the areas covered by the agencies they oversee, and well developed communication networks which give them significant opportunities to push aside any veil covering bureaucratic decisions and activities. Moreover, they indicate a surprisingly active approach to keeping track of agency activities, leading one to question the predominance in the contemporary period of the "fire alarm" approach described in the literature. The article develops reasons why an active information seeking style may be more attractive now than in the past and suggests a connection between environmental changes, changes in information seeking behavior, and changes in other aspects of oversight behavior. |
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