Ousting the Oligarchs: Assessing the Consequences of Reform and Change on Four House Committees

Abstract

The current system of federal advisory committees in the United States is both extensive and expanding. While there are significant differences between specific advisory bodies regarding their constitution, construction, and role in the process of public policy-making, the system itself facilitates the permanent institutionalization of linkages and dependencies between interest associations and federal administrative agencies. Indeed, it moves the role of pressure group influence on the policy-making process from that of a suspect input to that of a welcome withinput. Utilizing data derived from advisory committee compliance with the 1972 Federal Advisory Committee Act and selected case study material this article begins the process of exploring how the system functions, who participates in it, what impact it has on the development and formation of public policy, and who are its ultimate beneficiaries. It concludes by developing a framework for the assessment of potential advisory committee power and influence on the process of administrative policy-making and advances a preliminary assessment of the domination of industry interests on departmental advisory committees.