基于夏普里值法的城市更新单元规划空间增量分配方法探析——以深圳市岗厦河园片区为例

本文以深圳市岗厦河园片区改造为例,根据合作博弈和夏普里值法的相关理论,分析了城市更新改造过程中利益形成和分配的微观机制。研究发现,城市更新改造能够实现权利关系的合理再建,其前提是保证各方的收益与其在改造中的价值贡献比例对等。换而言之,城市更新改造过程所产生的总收益可以认为是权利主体所投入的空间资本、公共资本和改造资金等要素所创造的合作收益,应该按照各项要素在收益创造过程中的贡献情况以及权利主体对于要素的占有情况来分配改造后的收益。以此为基础,在空间结构优化完成的同时也能够实现对于利益相关者权利关系的理顺和明晰。

THE METHOD ON THE ALLOCATION OF CONSTRUCTION INCREMENTS IN THE URBAN RENEWAL UNIT BASED ON SHAPLEY VALUE: A CASE OF GANGXIA HEYUAN AREA IN SHENZHEN

With the reality of limited land resources, urban renewal is taken to use the developed land. However, it is hardly deal with the complex relationships of rights, interest sharing and stakeholders in the redevelopment of constructed land. Hence, the study on the allocation of the rights and interests in Shenzhen during the process of existed construction land re-development is essential and would provide potential planning efforts for the city's urban renewal strategies. By analyzing the micro-mechanism of the formation and allocation of incomes in the case of Gangxia Heyuan Area based on cooperation game and Shapley value theory, the paper reveals that union revenues are made by space capital, public capital and reconstruction funds from government, companies or famers. Under the Urban Renewal Police in Shenzhen, there is a consensus in the coordination, stakeholders are agreed to re-construct the relationship of rights and incomes through the renewal strategies of the physical space. It is the foundation of the renewal union which is consisted by spatial capital, public capital and renewal funds, rather than the government, land development companies or famers. Although there are different ways to share revenues, the Shapley value is appropriate for the paper with the axiomatization of the principle of fairness, justice, rationality and effectiveness.