Utopia and Pluralism: Demanding Too Much in the Name of Justice

ABSTRACT

In recent literature on utopianism, in particular non-ideal and realist work, the distinction between scepticism and non-scepticism has been to the fore. The main concern of this article, in contrast, is to show the importance of the distinction between pluralist and monist approaches. Firstly, pluralists can identify when utopian projects are guilty of demanding too much even when those projects are, all things considered, legitimate. Secondly, monists are unable to discern such prima facie wrongs, even when monism is combined with a sceptical critique of ideal theory. I advance this argument through a novel reading of Judith Shklar’s work, specifically her arguments concerning Rousseauian utopianism. In sharp contrast to the prevailing view in the literature, I maintain that the pluralism and scepticism of her early work is replaced by a monist scepticism in her mature work, a transformation that itself demonstrates the benefits of pluralism over (sceptical) monism.