| Abstract: | A spate of recent work on the Canadian Parliament highlights the importance of constituency pressures in understanding the legislative behavior of individual Members of Parliament (MPs). In light of this renaissance, we reexamine decisions by Canadian Liberal Party MPs to defy Prime Minister Jean Chrétien and his cabinet by supporting party-weakening reform in 2002. More specifically, we model votes on the question of selecting committee chairs through secret ballot as a function of factors both internal and external to the Parliament. While we find some evidence of exogenous, constituency-based forces, we find that support for reform was largely driven by internal party power dynamics. We gain additional insight into our findings by comparing this reform to analogous reforms in the US Congress. The patterns we uncover highlight the stark difference between the “double monopoly of power” held by party leaders in Westminster-style legislatures and the lack of such a monopoly in Congress. We conclude by advocating for more such comparisons, arguing that careful efforts to synthesize these and other similar reforms can improve our understanding of both legislatures despite the obvious and important differences between them. |
