The Arab Opposition Molehill

Arab Islamic oppositions have proven largely ineffectual in molding regime outcomes since the liberalizations of the 1980s and 1990s, although many continue to overestimate their potential for propelling reform. This article argues that a keen sense of the past is necessary when evaluating whether or not an opposition matters for political reform. Section I introduces noted scholar Juan Linz's notion of “semi‐opposition”—limited and “semi‐free” opposition groups that may sustain authoritarian regimes as much as repression. Using interviews and English and Arabic sources, Section II demonstrates historical correspondences between semi‐opposition and the Jordanian and Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (MB) organizations concerning origins and support, ideology and approach to politics, regime tolerance and political environment, and political behavior. Section III develops Linz's hypothesis on the links between semi‐opposition and authoritarian persistence by examining how the MB marginalizes and raises the costs of dissent for other opposition groups and actors. The MB is briefly contrasted with the Algerian Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) opposition party of 1989–1992 in Section IV . Decidedly not a semi‐opposition, the FIS proved far more transformative than either the Jordanian or Egyptian MB, inducing centrifugal politics and the collapse of the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) state that governed Algeria from 1962.