| Abstract: | This article explores the strained relationship between HaroldMacmillan's Conservative government and its senior representativein South-East Asia, the former minister George Selkirk. In particularit considers the impact of that relationship on the final yearsof colonial governance in Singapore. Between 1959 and 1963 Singaporeremained a British colonial territory enjoying internal self-government,and the most important British military base in South-East Asia.During these years Britain was the People's Action Party's guarantoragainst subversion. Newly released British documents deal withthe assessment of the communist threat. They reveal that Britaindid not have a single view of that threat. The British HighCommission in Kuala Lumpur and Britons remaining in the employof the Federation of Malaya after it gained independence inAugust 1957 argued that Britain should act as if the threatwas serious, in order to encourage the Malayan government tocreate a Malaysian federation. The United Kingdom Commissionin Singapore believed that Singapore's communists were indigenousleftists with valid claims to political legitimacy. They arguedthat these leftists could be overcome by political means ratherthan by mass detention. The British government in London hadlittle interest in Singapore's internal politics. Iain Macleodand Reginald Maudling were tardy in establishing any firm policyfor the island. Their successor as Colonial Secretary, DuncanSandys, accepted the advice of Selkirk on most issues in Singaporeanpolitics but overrode his reluctance to suppress the leftists.Singapore provides a case-study of the dilemmas of British ColdWar policy during the process of decolonization.
* The author wishes to thank the Humanities Research Board ofthe British Academy for its generous financial support of theresearch upon which this article is based. |
