| Abstract: | This article concerns itself with the Buddhist doctrine of upāya (“skilful means”). Rather than provide a historical analysis of the concept, this paper first of all outlines some of the presuppositions that affect both its working in a traditional Buddhist context and its interpretation in modern academic enquiry. It is argued that these contexts differ significantly and that they lead to quite different understandings of the role and function of the concept itself. Then, through reference to the Tibetan dGe lugs pa tradition and the background of Tibetan doxography, it is suggested that there are certain dangers in over‐emphasizing the concept of upāya in isolation. Most notably, if the doctrine of upāya is simplistically posited as some sort of aphilosophical praxis against rational enquiry, then there is a danger of not taking the tradition's own scholastic endeavours seriously enough and downplaying the status of rational enquiry in the tradition itself. |
