| 我国旅行社业挂靠经营现象的市场监管博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 梁智.我国旅行社业挂靠经营现象的市场监管博弈分析[J].旅游科学,2006,20(4):29-32. |
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| 作者姓名： | 梁智 |
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| 作者单位： | 天津财经大学,天津,300222 |
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| 摘 要： | 我国旅行社行业的挂靠经营现象屡禁不止，成为危害旅行社经营环境和损害旅游者合法权益的一大顽症。本文从博弈论的角度出发，建立起挂靠经营现象博弈模型和挂靠经营监管博弈模型，并运用这些模型对旅行社和挂靠者在挂靠经营合作中的策略选择、政府部门与旅行社及其合作伙伴的期望收益、旅游市场监管效果等进行了深入的分析，并在此基础上提出了政策建议。
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| 关 键 词： | 旅行社 挂靠经营 市场监管 博弈 |
| 文章编号： | 1006-575（2006）-04-0029-04 |
| 收稿时间： | 2005-11-27 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005年11月27 |
An Analysis of the Market Regulation Game of Affiliating Operation in China's Travel Agency Industry |
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| LIANG Zhi.An Analysis of the Market Regulation Game of Affiliating Operation in China's Travel Agency Industry[J].Tourism Science,2006,20(4):29-32. |
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| Authors: | LIANG Zhi |
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| Abstract: | The affiliating operation phenomenon in China's travel industry is an issue that still exists though prohibited by the government.It actually has become a persistent tumor that hazards the operation environment of travel agencies and violates the legal rights and interest of tourists.By applying the game theory,the author established an affiliating operation control model and made an in-depth analysis of the expected earnings of governmental departments,travel agencies and their partners,and the effect of market regulation as well.It also suggested some policies. |
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| Keywords: | travel agency affiliating operation market regulation game |
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