| Abstract: | In March 1957 Harold Macmillan expressed to Dwight Eisenhower that the British government was ‘considering abandoning Hong Kong’. The hitherto unknown Hong Kong Question in 1957 grew primarily out of Britain's imperial decline, and particularly the difficulties of defending Hong Kong. During the Cold War Hong Kong was a colony too valuable for Britain to abandon in peace, and yet too peripheral to be worth committing scarce resources to for its survival at war. The British dilemmas were exacerbated by the 1956 riots in Hong Kong and the general defence review undertaken by the Macmillan government in 1957, both of which raised serious questions about the adequacy of a reduced garrison to maintain internal security. The United States also showed concern about the future of the British colony in the light of Anglo-American differences over the Suez crisis and China policy. As a result of the Bermuda and Washington conferences in 1957, the Anglo-American relationship was restored by Eisenhower and Macmillan, a restoration which, as the latter saw it, made Hong Kong ‘a joint defence problem’ between the two allies. Together with the Chinese communist policy of leaving the colony alone, the Hong Kong Question was thus resolved inadvertently. |
