Following the Money: Corruption,Conflict, and the Winners and Losers of Suburban Land Acquisition in China

Land acquisition in suburban China is not merely the administrative means through which land is transferred from collectively owned rural land to state‐owned urban land; it is also a process of unlawful profit grabbing by rent‐seeking stakeholders. This licentiousness has been the source of intense controversy in recent years, becoming a major source of social unrest in contemporary China. Although standards of compensation are legally governed by strict policies, these standards are rarely followed as prescribed. As a result, we know very little about how revenue from land acquisition is shared in practice. This is because, as a contentious political issue rife with corrupt practices, accurate data are extremely difficult to obtain. This paper aims to address this vast empirical gap by tracing the flow of profit proliferation and distribution in a land acquisition case, using a suburban village in Shandong province, China, as an example. To expedite the drawn‐out acquisition process, the local government permits the corrupt behaviour of the village party secretary, who exploits his position to amass a great personal fortune. In contrast to previous research, which emphasises low compensation standards or excessive profit grabbing by local government, we find that villagers' protests are triggered by the corrupt practices of the village party secretary.