| Abstract: | Creating institutions that foster the production of objective and balanced policy analysis is a challenging task for all types of regimes. The value of neutral competence often suffers in tradeoffs with the value of responsiveness, especially in the exercise of executive authority. Institutional designers, however, are not without resources for structuring arrangements to promote the production of objective and balanced policy analysis: organizations can be created with an incentive to achieve "reputations" for neutral competence; organizations can be isolated from being too politically responsive through forms of "independence"; for promoting interaction based on "professional norms" can be created to resolve conflicts about prediction; "participation in international organizations" can be leveraged to counteract domestic biases; and "transparency" can be employed to facilitate balancing of views or to shame severe abuses. This essay sets out the logic underlying design with these sorts of institutional resources, illustrates their use primarily in the U.S. context, and speculates on their application in consolidating democracies. |
