The Politics of Chivalry: Sir Robert Walpole,the Duke of Montagu and the Order of the Bath

This article explores the complex circumstances surrounding the foundation of the order of the Bath in 1725, and seeks to correct the commonly‐held view that it was initiated by Walpole simply to augment the patronage available to his supporters in parliament. The proposal for a new order of chivalry based on the medieval ‘knighthood of the bath’ in fact emanated from the court, having been prompted by one of its central figures, the duke of Montagu. Walpole and his colleagues were by no means oblivious to the practical political value of such a move, but having only lately consolidated their position at court, their main priority was to seize a unique opportunity to flatter the new royal dynasty and garner popularity for it through the medium of the order's rediscovered history. The ministers selected the order's 36 founder‐knights with considerable input from senior courtiers, but ensured that those nominated were mostly peers and MPs who could evince ministerially useful connections between court and parliament. Though the order was later derided as a symptom of Walpoleian corruption, its foundation can be regarded as something of a turning point in Walpole's rise to power.     

Robert Harley and the Ministerial Revolution of 1710 (edited by W.A. SPECK)

The ministerial revolution of 1710 transformed a predominantly whig administration in April to a tory-dominated ministry by September. Historians have generally attributed this transformation to the political objectives and skills of Robert Harley. But such a conclusion makes the methodological error of deducing his intentions from the outcome. On close examination Harley did not intend to make such drastic changes initially. On the contrary, he wished to limit them to the removal of the earl of Sunderland from his secretaryship of state and the earl of Godolphin from the lord treasurership, and to curtail, if not eliminate, the influence of the duke of Marlborough and his duchess in affairs of state. Other whigs, especially the so-called junto, he hoped to retain in power. This would have necessitated the retention of the existing parliament which did not have to be dissolved under the Triennial Act until 1711. These plans came unstuck. The junto, though prepared to take Harley seriously, eventually refused to deal with him and resigned their offices. Harley was also obliged to take in more tories than he wanted. The main reason for the failure of his original plan was the influence of Queen Anne, which has been overlooked or underestimated in previous accounts.     

Parliament,the Tories and Frederick,Prince of Wales*

The alliance between the tories and Frederick, Prince of Wales has usually appeared at best a passing interlude of opportunism in eighteenth‐century politics, dismissed alike by scholars upholding ‘jacobite’ or ‘Hanoverian’ constructions of the party's identity. This article offers a re‐examination of the relationship, assessing tory actions at Westminster against the larger hinterland of party literature and journalism. It argues that, especially after 1747, the association fronted a much more serious enterprise than is conventionally assumed, highlighting the continued political and ideological independence of the party into the 1750s and shaping the subsequent evolution of its identity. Intellectually, Frederick's image as a ‘Patriot King’ was driven by radical manifestos originating within the jacobite diaspora in Paris. Inside Westminster, his patronage changed the balance of power, bringing the tories to a point of primacy hitherto unmatched over the larger opposition. For four years, the promise of the prince of Wales provided the glue to hold the tory party together; his death threatened to unleash a process of fragmentation. The long‐term legacy of the alliance informed the direction of those who remained tories into the following decade, determining the section of the party that would gain the ascendancy within the reign of George III. By showing how a member of the ruling dynasty could be recast in a favourable and highly partisan political complexion, the pact with Frederick represented a decisive stage in the reinvention of English toryism, and its movement from mid‐century opposition towards rebirth as the loyalist champions of the house of Hanover.     

The Liberal Party,Free Trade and the 1841 Election

It is a paradox that the Liberal Party's electoral defeat in 1841 attested to its underlying strength and vitality. This article focuses on the impact on party unity of the free trade measures advocated by the ministry in the months preceding its fall. The Liberal Party's bold electoral platform antagonised its protectionist MPs, a group previously overlooked in the historiography, but fell short of the demands of its radical wing for political reform. While all the ingredients for fragmentation existed, unity prevailed. Protestations of loyalty to the leadership could be heard from the mouths of Liberal MPs of all shades, from stalwart protectionists who coalesced around the ministry on traditional foreign policy grounds through to the most fervent radicals who celebrated its ‘new’ direction. Such findings of cohesion contradict accounts which have hitherto viewed the 1841 electoral defeat as evidence of the party's inchoateness. Indeed, this article shifts the historiographical narrative away from addressing why the Liberals lost to the more pertinent issue of why the losses suffered were not greater. In answering that question, both the sensitivity with which the financial agenda was presented by ministers and the flexibility of different sections of the Liberal Party in interpreting and presenting the free trade measures to the electorate are underlined. Above all, Lord John Russell is rehabilitated as a ‘popular’ leader and his importance in the development of the nascent Liberal Party is unearthed.