Evaluating Stakeholder Participation and Influence on State-Level Rulemaking

Despite sustained attention to the role of stakeholders in policymaking—both in legislative and regulatory venues—we lack a systematic understanding of whether and when stakeholders wield influence over decisions. This is particularly true regarding state-level rulemaking in the United States, which has become an important venue of policy action as federal policymaking is increasingly stymied. Although the specifics of the rulemaking process vary to some degree across states, determining whether common patterns of stakeholder influence exist across states and issue areas can advance our understanding of regulatory institutions more broadly. This study contributes to the growing body of scholarship on state-level rulemaking by analyzing the ways in which stakeholders participate in rulemaking processes and the effects on rulemaking decisions of such participation in three policy domains across five states. We find that while industry may be influential during rulemaking across cases, consequential opportunities for non-industry stakeholders to influence regulatory decisions also exist.     

Multiple Principals, Multiple Signals: A Signaling Approach to Principal-Agent Relations

This study suggests a key element of the principal-agent relationship involves communication between potential principals and their agents. We suggest communications often resemble a signaling process in which potential principals indicate their interest in policy matters through multiple venues. This study models changes in the levels of rulemaking activity by the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission as a function of increased salience in public, congressional and executive venues.     

The “Science” of Policy Development During Administrative Rulemaking

The legitimacy of government agencies rests in part on the premise that public administrators use scientific evidence to make policy decisions. Yet, what happens when there is no consensus in the scientific evidence—i.e., when the science is in conflict? I theorize that scientific conflict yields greater policy change during administrative policymaking. I assess this claim using data from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA). I identify policy change—what I refer to as “policy development” in this article—between the FDA's draft and final rules with a novel text analysis measure of shifts in regulatory restrictions. I then go on to find that more policy development does occur with scientific conflict. Moreover, using corresponding survey data, I uncover suggestive evidence that one beneficiary of such conflict may be participating interest groups. Groups lobby harder—and attempt to change more of the rule—during conflict, while an in‐survey experiment provides evidence of increased interest group influence on rule content when scientific conflict is high.