Modeling the effect of mandatory district compactness on partisan gerrymanders

Geographic compactness standards have been offered as neutral and effective standards constraining redistricting. In this paper, we test this allegation. Redistricting is treated as a combinatoric optimization problem that is constrained by compactness rules. Computer models are used to analyze the results of applying compactness standards when political groups are geographically concentrated. Several population models are used to generate populations of voters, and arbitrary plans are created with combinatoric optimization algorithms. We find that compactness standards can be used to limit gerrymandering, but only if such standards require severe compactness. Compactness standards are not politically neutral—a geographically concentrated minority party will be affected by compactness standards much differently than a party supported by a geographically diffuse population. The particular effects of compactness standards depend on the institutional mechanism that creates districts.     

The Partisan Impacts of Non-Partisan Redistricting: Northern Ireland 1993–95

Space is manipulated for political purposes in a great variety of ways, and its restructuring is frequently a focus of conflict. The nature of such conflict is explored here.¹ Legislation requires that all parliamentary constituencies in the United Kingdom are periodically reviewed by independent Boundary Commissions. The Fourth Periodic Review in Northern Ireland began in 1993 and coincided with a period of intense political activity, associated with what was commonly termed 'the peace process'. Political parties, anxious to ensure that the resulting boundaries favoured their partisan interests (and, in the case of Sinn Fein, keen to establish their democratic bona fides ), invested considerable effort in their attempts to influence the outcome. The Commissions' recommendations became the subject of claim and counter-claim regarding bias towards one or other of the province's two main communities – Nationalist and Unionist – and as a result of that conflict, they were revised with priority given to a different criterion. This paper evaluates those claims with a close inspection of the redistricting process, illustrating how an ostensibly non-partisan process is partisan in both its conduct and its outcome.     

The compactness of federal electoral districts in Canada in the 1980s and 1990s: an exploratory analysis

Considerations of the compactness and aesthetics of electoral districts have loomed large in the litigation surrounding the last round of US redistricting. For a variety of reasons, we expect that there will be increasing pressure on Canadian electoral cartographers to provide opportunities for protected minorities to be represented in the country's federal legislature. As a result, we expect that future electoral maps may well embody a tradeoff between compactness and other representational and cartographic desiderata. We look for evidence of this in an exploratory analysis of the last two federal electoral maps (adopted in 1987 and 1996) and in so doing we offer the first country-wide assessment of the compactness of Canadian federal electoral districts (FEDs). The results demonstrate the importance of natural boundaries in the achievement of district compactness. Strong evidence of a decline in the compactness of FEDs between the two maps is not forthcoming, however. Thus there is relatively little sign that Canadian electoral districts will be open to the kind of aesthetically-based legal challenges that American Congressional Districts faced in the 1990s. However, the analyses we report establish an important baseline against which the next electoral map, to be produced following the 2001 census, can be compared.     

Electoral redistricting and minority political representation in Canada and the United States

This article compares the political representation of visible minorities in Canada and the United States, focusing on differences in federal redistribution (redistricting) practices and constituency composition. Although the two countries both use territorially‐based electoral systems, they operate under different legal standards and institutional environments for the creation of ridings (districts). In the US, redistricting is a highly political process, yet must respect strict population equality standards. Litigation over redistricting is common, and courts adjudicate voting and representation under a constitutional system enforcing strong individual rights. In contrast, Canada's redistribution process is relatively nonpartisan, permits large population variances among ridings, places more emphasis on community rights, and is seldom subject to extensive court challenges. Despite these differences, the two countries exhibit striking similarities in the overall level of visible minority representation relative to population share. Conversely, Canada's population inequalities among ridings create a systematic disadvantage for visible minorities. Political attention to visible minority representation is stronger in the US, but the means to achieve it are constrained both by the judicial limits on group representation and the constitutional limits on the use of racial identity. Canada has a framework for political representation that could easily accommodate significant visible minority representation but lacks the political imperative to use it, in part because doing so would run counter to Canada's multicultural image of these groups as immigrants rather than as non‐white minorities.     

The legal (de)construction of geography: race and political community in supreme court redistricting decisions

This article examines the different conceptions of racial identity and ‘geography’ in two landmark Supreme Court decisions, Shaw v. Reno (1993) and Easley v. Cromartie (2001). Both decisions evaluated similar Congressional redistricting plans in North Carolina, but reached opposite conclusions. In Reno, the Court based its reasoning on the ‘objective’, ‘natural’ and ‘rational’ geography of North Carolina. Such geographic relationships create political communities and constrain the way in which state legislatures can draw electoral districts. In contrast, the Easley decision based its reasoning on voting behaviour, and makes an implicit appeal to deliberative democratic principles. From this perspective, political relationships create the geographic relationships defined by Congressional district boundaries. Where the Reno decision treats race as an arbitrary social distinction that the state should not use as the basis of political representation, the Easley opinion argues that the state can consider differences in racial voting behaviour during the redistricting process. More fundamentally, the Easley decision implies that racial identity is formed by deliberative political communities, rather than being an objective, static characteristic. This suggests that disputes over spatial relationships are critical to the construction of hegemonic racial identities, and that space is fundamental to the conception of racial difference.