The origins of the modern emotions: Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia and the embodied mind

In the history of European ideas, Princess Elisabeth is conventionally viewed as little more than a curiosity, a clever but ultimately unimportant exiled princess who became the confidant, critic, and muse of a far more famous man, René Descartes. Contrary to this view, however, this article argues that Elisabeth made a significant contribution to the development of western philosophy in her own right. Drawing on her letters to Descartes, as well the diaries and correspondence of her associates and a range of secondary sources, it demonstrates that an early understanding of the modern emotions akin to that which later found form in the work of the moral sentiment theorists can be found in Elisabeth’s thought. In particular, drawing on her understanding of the embodied mind, Elisabeth of Bohemia began to develop a hybrid understanding of the passions, identified a role for the emotions in the pursuit of virtue, and began to reconceive the relationship between reason and the emotions that had until then dominated seventeenth-century thought.     

Therapies for Melancholy and Inordinate Passion in the Letters of Dorothy Osborne to Sir William Temple (1652–1654)

Dorothy Osborne’s letters to Sir William Temple, written during the period of the secret, protracted courtship between the pair, demonstrate a persistent interest in melancholy and in the regulation of inordinate passion. Osborne draws on a variety of discourses of melancholy to construct herself and Temple as melancholy lovers. She also uses her letters to express and regulate her passions associated with the uncertainty of the couple’s future. This essay argues that Osborne privileges literary therapies for inordinate passion, employing affective, therapeutic processes of reading and writing within the letters themselves.     

Evolution from molecules to men

Early modern philosophers discussed the question of time in a variety of contexts; an enduring theme is the connection between time and the rational powers of the human soul. However, authors from a variety of confessional and philosophical perspectives also considered how the passions of the soul engage both humans and animals with the temporal world. This article considers a debate about the connections between time and the passions between two French physicians, Marin Cureau de la Chambre (1594–1669) and Pierre Chanet (c.1603–c.1660). The article explores the extent to which their background in late Aristotelian philosophy shaped this project, and its place within the broader transformation of the philosophy of time in the seventeenth century. Cureau and Chanet belong within a well-known early modern tradition of debates about animal reasoning, but their discussion of time and the passions is a significant yet neglected episode in the vernacularisation of scholastic and Aristotelian natural philosophy.     

Liquid passions: bodies,publics and city waters

This article explores water’s capacities as a vibrant matter with specific properties that generates passions, attachments and a sense of belonging, and which enrols bodies in new connections, socialities, alliances and politics in unpredictable ways. Based on research into practices and engagements with water in a large urban public space the paper builds on studies of blue space. It concludes that water has the capacity to enhance a sense of well-being in those that swim in it and to mobilise a very particular sense of embodiment which gives this form of public space its distinctiveness constituting new forms of sociality and connections amongst diverse individuals. It seeks to do this by paying attention to the experiences of things themselves and the active participation of nonhuman forces in events and the ‘vital materiality’ that runs through and across bodies both human and non-human. The article also explores water’s capacity to be constituted and defined by experts as dangerous and risky matter, and to thus engender political associations and connections amongst diverse groups who seek to oppose such expert interventions.     

Jacobitism and the English people, 1688–1788

This essay investigates the marginalisation in eighteenth-century literary theoretical discussions of a category of emotion, ‘the affections’, which plays a significant role elsewhere in eighteenth-century thought, especially in moral philosophy and theology. It proposes that affections are incompatible with a series of principles that underpin dominant concepts of the literary in early and mid-eighteenth-century literary criticism by authors including Kames, Burke, Alison, Duff, Brown, Du Bos, Trapp and Beattie, many of whom were associated with the Scottish Enlightenment. By analysing eighteenth-century theories of the perceived obscurity of literary emotions in comparison with the emotions of the other fine arts (in particular, painting and music), and by highlighting the perceived distinction of literary emotions from what theorists of the period term ‘reality’, it shows how the supremacy of the belief that literary merit is tied to the individuality, particularity, and plausibility of represented emotion gives rise to a prioritisation of passions over affections in literary critical discussions about the emotions.     

Towards a history of emotion, 1562–1660

Abstract

This article examines uses of the word emotion during the seventeenth century, arguing that the term's meaning at this time was in flux. OED gives three principle definitions of emotion, the first as meaning ‘political turmoil or agitation’, the second as meaning literally ‘movement or motion’, and the third as meaning ‘strong feelings or passing’. I argue that a great many uses of emotion during the seventeenth century apply the word in the second sense to the physiological movements of humours. This being so, I suggest that in emotion's seventeenth-century uses it is possible to read a transition in the word's meaning. Through its frequent use with references to humours in motion, the word begins to take on the characteristics which would allow it to develop into meaning ‘feelings or passions’.     

Milton,the passions,and the knowing body

ABSTRACT

This paper challenges the notion that Galenic humouralism stripped the early modern body of agency and argues that some accounts of early modern materialism were connected to epistemology. It evidences how Milton’s passions are inscribed with the shocking language of agency and moral responsibility to overturn the assumption of “passive”, unconscious passions. It explores two pictures of passions in connection with knowledge: passions as obstacles to knowledge, and passions as sources as knowledge. Both images recast the material body as a knowing agent, but do so with complications. Agency-ridden passions complicate a straightforward notion of agency, and seem to leave early moderns with the option of blaming their passions instead of themselves for deception. Frequent references to internal passions in political discourses also suggests an unsettling degree of comfort with subjectivity in making knowledge-statements, but it is a version of subjectivity that seems far more public than private.