A Great American Scholar of the Royal Navy? The Disputed Legacy of Arthur Marder Revisited

This article examines the scholarly reputation of the late Professor Arthur J. Marder. Once universally acclaimed as the doyen of historians of the Royal Navy in the First World War era, in recent times his work has come in for sustained criticism from a small group of revisionist historians, who not only dispute his conclusions, but argue that his entire methodology and approach were fundamentally flawed. This article assesses the specific charges of inadequate scholarship levelled against Marder by these revisionist historians and concludes that, while aspects of Marder's analysis may well be open to dispute, there are no grounds for attacking his scholarly integrity. On the contrary, he thoroughly deserves his reputation as a pioneering and painstaking scholar.     

“本土安全”思想对中国近代海疆安全战略的影响

本土安全是近代中国海疆安全战略的终极目标。由于战略目标的局限,中国虽然拥有具备远洋作战能力的海军,但却无法在海军军备建设、军力部署,以及战略战备等方面摆脱海岸防御战略的影响。受本土安全思想的影响,中国的战略决策者在甲午战争中屡失战机,而近代中国海疆安全战略体系也因此崩溃。     

James McNeill Whistler in Chile: Portrait of the Artist as Arms Dealer

The colorful and controversial life of American artist James Abbott McNeill Whistler took many twists and turns. One of the most dramatic and least explicable of the turns came in 1866, when he traveled to Valparaiso, Chile. Generations of Whistler biographers have been puzzled by the reasons for this sojourn, but a recently discovered collection of documents provides significant clues for solving the mystery. Whistler, it seems, had become involved in a scheme to provide weapons to the Chilean navy in a war against Spain. The scheme turned into a fiasco, dashing Whistler’s hopes of handsome financial profits, but his weeks in South America significantly shaped his development as an artist.     

‘The Navy Principle is Now ‘Safety First’’: Naval Aspects of the Papuan Campaign in the Second World War

Abstract

Inter-service rivalry and personality friction characterized various stages of the US war effort in the Paci?c against the Japanese. The ?ghting at Buna exempli?ed these problems, in which inter-service friction (among other reasons) deprived Allied troops of needed naval support during the Papuan campaign of 1942–43.     

The Roman Shipwreck of Antirhodos Island in the Portus Magnus of Alexandria,Egypt

Between 1998 and 1999 three excavation campaigns were undertaken on a shipwreck at the now‐submerged site of the ancient Portus Magnus, off the coast of Alexandria. The site, close to the island of Antirhodos, was identified through geophysical and archaeological surveys carried out by the Institut Européen d’Archéologie Sous‐Marine (IEASM), directed by Franck Goddio. The remains of the ship lie c.5 m deep and are spread over c.350 sqm. No cargo has been found. Artefacts recovered, the details of the ship's architecture and radiocarbon dating all suggest it sunk between the end of the 1st century BCE and the 1st century CE. Its dimensions correspond to those of commercial ships of the Roman era. Identification of the wood used contributes significantly to our knowledge of materials used in naval architecture of this period.     

Towards a definition of naval elites: reconsidering social change in Britain,France and Spain,c.1670–1810

Abstract

This work proposes the term ‘naval elites’ in order to provide a new interpretation of social change in the eighteenth century from a comparative perspective. Naval elites, a social group formed by a part of the naval officer corps and midshipmen, are here defined as a historical instrument, the particular and intriguing features of which may be useful in the revision of some perspectives on social change. In particular, the authors analyse shifting power relationships through the reconsideration of naval patronage and bureaucracy, revisit the process of naval professionalization and the transformation of the concept of merit, and suggest that naval elites embodied new notions of social distinction and exclusiveness.     

长崎传习与日本近代海军的初创

1853年黑船事件发生后,德川幕府和各藩开始发展近代海军。为培养海军人才,幕府于1854年8月聘请＂森宾＂号舰长法比尤斯及其部属在长崎进行了预备传习活动。1855年底,幕府正式创办长崎海军传习所。从1855年至1859年共聘请了两批荷兰教官,招募了三期包括幕府和各藩的学生,培养了大量优秀人才,为近代日本海军的发展奠定了基础。     

Archaeology of a 17th‐century Naval Battle: the first two seasons of the Rockley Bay Research Project in Tobago

On 3 March 1677, French Vice‐Admiral Jean d'Estrées launched an assault on an inferior Dutch squadron, commanded by Jacob Binckes, anchored in Rockley Bay, Tobago. The French attack was defeated, but a total of 12 warships on both sides were sunk. The Rockley Bay Research Project, supported by the Institute of Nautical Archaeology and the University of Connecticut began an archaeological investigation of the battle in 2012. At least one of the Dutch men‐of‐war lost in the battle has been found, TRB‐5. The article is a preliminary report on the work that has been carried out so far.     

The Earliest Naval Ram

Analyses of the Kuyunjik (Kouyunjik) relief and other data suggest Phoenicia probably did not build ships with rams before the Battle of Salamis. A review of Greek literature, iconography, and archaeology suggests the naval ram may have been a Greek invention, appearing at the earliest in the 6th century BC and possibly as late as the 5th century. Its evolution may have led to a shift from laced to pegged mortise-and-tenon joinery in Greek shipbuilding as well as the development of the wineglass-shaped hull and heavier framing. It may also have influenced the development of large-scale bronze-casting in Greece.
© 2008 The Author     

The naval reform of Emperor John II Komnenos: a re-evaluation

The eleventh and twelfth centuries have traditionally been interpreted as the era when the Byzantine navy declined, and then was allowed to disappear. Historians often mark the death knell of the Byzantine navy with Emperor John II Komnenos ending the collection of taxes for localized defence fleets. Niketas Choniates describes the act as a money-hungry measure devised by the finance minister John of Poutza, whereby fleet taxes would be collected and spent centrally, leading to the end of localized fleets as funds were diverted to other sectors. This reform has traditionally been interpreted as one that led to losing a war with Venice in the 1120s, provincial insecurity, the eventual outsourcing of the Byzantine navy to the Italians, and finally the sack of Constantinople itself by the forces of the Fourth Crusade when the Italians turned against them.Such an interpretation does not however sit easily with the reign of John II Komnenos, during which on numerous occasions the navy is referenced as playing a crucial part in the emperor’s campaigns, a feature that began in Alexios’ reign and continued into Manuel’s. Though Pryor and Jeffreys have previously expressed doubt that such a centralising naval reform could really spell the end of the Byzantine fleet, and possibly the empire itself, this paper will build upon that doubt with evidence that necessitates a re-evaluation of the traditional interpretation. First, the narrative of John’s war with Venice in the 1120s will be examined, followed by how the subsequent naval reform was shaped by these events, which themselves only confirmed the experiences of the Byzantine Navy in previous decades, and so highlighted the need for reform. This analysis will demonstrate that a centralising reform was a coherent measure undertaken to increase the efficiency of the fleet, and to recognize officially trends in organization that had already emerged under Alexios. Subsequent fleet operations in John and Manuel’s reigns reveal that the role of the navy did indeed change in the early twelfth century, but the narrative of decline is false. Throughout this section it will also be shown that analysis of the Byzantine navy has been overly shaped by use of hostile sources. The second part of this paper will then move on to highlight three major uses of the fleet that have been undervalued by scholars focused on traditional sea battles: its use on rivers as well as the sea, its use for transport and logistics, and its ‘soft power’ diplomatic capacity. The combination of these factors reveal a Byzantine navy that was a crucial part of the Komnenian restoration of Byzantine fortunes in the twelfth century, and that its decline after the death of Manuel must be seen as a product of other factors, rather than a cause of the late twelfth-century imperial decline in itself.