HISTORIA MAGISTRA VITAE,INTERRUPTING: THUCYDIDES AND THE AGONISTIC TEMPORALITY OF ANTIQUITY AND MODERNITY

In this essay I discuss Koselleck's thesis on the dissolution of historia magistra vitae in modernity with a view to exploring how the modern historiographical engagement with Thucydides entails qualifications of this argument. Focusing on Barthold Georg Niebuhr's contextualization of Thucydides in a new temporality of “ancient and modern history,” I examine how modernity is caught between conflicting notions of its own prehistory, and that this conflict suggests that the forward‐leaping qualities of Neuzeit were co‐articulated with other temporal notions, and particularly an idea of historical exemplarity associated with historia magistra vitae. This plurality of times highlights an agonistic temporality linking antiquity and modernity: a model of conflicting times inscribed in a dialogue through which modern historiography interrupted the “useful” history of antiquity, while simultaneously being itself interrupted by it. By following this dialogue, I seek to test two interrelated hypotheses: a) that modernity produced a multitemporal scheme in which the ideas of differential time and the future were intertwined with a notion of historia magistra vitae as meaningful and sense‐bearing time; and b) that contradictions in this scheme arising from the modern confrontation with Thucydides's poetics challenges the opposition between historia magistra vitae and modern historical sense and configures a temporality that is self‐agonistic in the sense that it confronts historical actors before and beyond the terms through which they may be able to give it meaning. Formulated as a poetics of the possible, this notion is approached as a corrective alternative to the modern consideration of the future as distanced from the space of experience, but nonetheless as grounded in actuality and therefore largely mastered by human knowledge and action.     

Vico and the disgregation of historia salutis

This study aims to analyse the problem of Vico’s religiosity, still a subject for debate, in the European tradition of universal historiography. Vico’s historical reconstruction has traditionally been considered as orthodox and apologetic. The Neapolitan philosopher, in his major work, New Science, tried to defend not only the historical veracity and authority of biblical narratives as the only source to reconstruct the initial phases of history, but also the temporal and spatial frame of historia salutis, confuting the thesis of a greater antiquity of pagan nations. Nonetheless, it is difficult to conclude that Vico’s historical reconstruction followed the same route of the apologists of his time. Vico demolished not the temporal and spatial sphere, but the unitary frame of historia salutis. In Vico’s setting, all nations formed their civilizations in an autochthonous way and developed them autonomously with diverse timetables. Vico introduced the concept of the plurality of history. In this way, the Neapolitan philosopher contributed to the process of secularization of universal history in a completely different way from his contemporaries.     

Negative Freedom,Catholic Social Doctrine,and the Conciliar Challenge of the Free Society

The idea of “negative freedom” has been at the heart of modern democratic politics; it has also been an idea regarded warily by Catholic social doctrine. To be sure, Catholic social doctrine now embraces the classic negative political freedoms like freedom of religion and freedom of speech. But the hierarchical magisterium of the Church was slow to arrive at such an embrace. And in the last decades the hierarchical magisterium has renewed its skepticism of the idea, seeing it as both important and often misused. This article considers current criticisms of negative freedom by Catholic social doctrine and seeks to respond to such criticisms by appealing to personalist conceptions of freedom in the philosophy of Charles Taylor and in the theology of Walter Kasper. Overall, the aim of the article is to establish a more sure conceptual basis for negative freedom as an essential component of the commitment by the Catholic Church at the Second Vatican Council to the free society.     

Contiguity and Similarity as Poetic Modes in Some Poems of Gongora

This article explores how different authors who suffered the violence of the 1970s and 1980s revolutionary movements and military dictatorships in the Southern Cone countries of Latin America look back from a post-dictatorship present to write the history of their recent past. Nostalgia and critical reflection join forces to recreate the feelings of loss of individuals whose identities crashed due to the failure of political projects that once were conceived as messianic, as well as to critically reclaim the past in order to construct alternative futures for themselves as individuals and for the community. The article focuses mainly on the Chilean Diamela Eltit's novel Jamás el fuego nunca (2007), in which an old couple of former revolutionary militants of the Left imprisoned in a claustrophobic space—an old bed—explore their past as militants and as a couple to understand and question notions of individual and collective identity in the aftermath of traumatic and tumultuous experiences. The novel is read in the context of other narratives such as Chilean Luz Arce's testimonial, El infierno (1993) and Argentine political scientist Pilar Calveiro's essays, Poder y desaparición (1998) and Política y/o violencia (2005), among others. This article's theoretical contribution lies in its emphasis on the ethical consideration of listening to all of the narratives that speak to us about that era cognizant of their differing motivations, desires, tonalities, and subjective trajectories. Only by paying close attention to the polyphony of voices and documents about the past—especially those that speak to us from a time of subjective crisis and trauma—can we achieve a true sense of historicity.     

Semantics of learned quackery in the 17th and 18th centuries

In the 17th and 18th century republic of letters the problem of scientific fraud was met with a discourse of charlatanism. Departing from Johann Burchhard Menckes famous treatise on the Charlatanry of the learned the following essay traces how the accusations of academic and scientific misconduct put in terms of 'charlatanry' primarily helped to produce the new species of the erudite 'charlatan'. Facing a growing complexity of scientific culture this new frame of meaning, structured by numerous examples of scientific misconduct offered a new way of orientation in the world of learning. But besides its cognitive impacts the discourse of charlatanry allowed to create symbolic boundaries, which determined decisions upon the affiliation or non affiliation to the new forming scientific community by separating honourable from dishonourable scientific personae. Speaking of charlatanry therefore always implied a social distinction as much as a scientific. The discourses on charlatanry also mirror differentiations within the scientific field. At first dominated by a critique built on courteous or bourgeois values, the scientific field later on developed its own criteria of appraisal like authorship, originality, transparency etc. Attracting the attention of a further growing public sphere, the explicit verbalisation of claims not relating to the value system of a republic of letters primarily concerned with the production and distribution of knowledge finally led up to a more implicit moral economy of science. A change that at a large scale level can be described both as an internalisation of the values of scientific conduct and differentiation between justiciable and unjusticiable transgressions of the norms set up by the scientific community.     

Perceptions and Misperceptions of Regime Stability and Iran's Convoluted Rise to Regional Influence

This article seeks to explain revolutionary Iran's convoluted rise to regional prominence over the last three decades. We hold that perceptions and misperceptions of regime stability (both of one's self and of others) by the relevant actors have played a major role in Iran's recent. The main logic is that the success of many strategies employed by relevant regional actors to augment their regional influence (both Iran seeking more influence and others seeking to stem that influence) have crucially hinged on making correct assessments of regime stability. This study has both theoretical and empirical findings. Theoretically, we find that failures to accurately estimate regime stability stem from three main sources: (1) objective uncertainties regarding the target state's level of regime stability, given the high strength of societal forces shaping state‐society relations in the Middle East and given the distinct variation between autocrats in terms of their ability to develop effective counterrevolutionary/repressive tools; (2) ideological blinders, from which both the United States and regional actors frequently suffer, which have often led them to be falsely optimistic regarding the existence of either subversive opportunities or opportunities to stabilize regimes facing domestic pressures; and (3) incorrect theories regarding sources of regime stability which lead experts and policymakers to overlook factors which may destabilize a regime. This article has two major empirical findings. First, Iran's rise may be at least partly attributed to Iran demonstrating a slightly better learning curve at the tactical level (i.e., learning subversive skills from its Lebanese experience in the 1980s–1990s and applying them to Iraq in the 2000s–2010s) as well as at the strategic level (i.e., understanding the limits of its subversive capacities and correctly assessing when it can engage in successful stabilizing operations). Second, two errors committed by the United States have been far more consequential than those committed by Iran for the regional balance of power: First, the George W. Bush Administration myopically opened up subversive opportunities for Iran when it invaded Iraq in 2003 by thinking that it could stabilize a democratic regime and insulate it from outside influence; second, on two occasions Washington overestimated the transformative effect that its concessions to Iran would have in terms of sufficiently empowering reformists so as to bring about complete regime transformation from within.