Between orthodoxy and heterodoxy: the troubled relationships between heritage studies and heritage law

This article discusses the relationships between heritage law (HL) and heritage studies (HS) from the perspective of international law. More specifically, it focuses on the ways in which HL scholars have integrated (or failed to integrate) HS considerations into their work, and vice versa. The paper shows that the relationship between HL and HS is better resolved with respect to orthodox approaches to both law and heritage. More specifically, orthodox HS and HL take each other into account only lightly, a strategy that, while unsatisfactory on many grounds, is balanced on both sides. However, when it comes to heterodox (critical) analyses in these fields, the relationship is far more fragile and unbalanced, from the point of view of heterodox HS, the law tends to be neglected or even sometimes rejected; whereas from the point of view of HL, there is a more conscious effort to fully engage with HS, which is made difficult by heterodox HS’s push against the law. This dissonance can lead to severe difficulties in understanding heritage work and even the field itself.     

UNIVERSAL AND PROFANE: THE HISTORIOGRAPHICAL CONSEQUENCES OF NATURAL RELIGION

Natural religion in the eighteenth century was seemingly unhistorical or even antihistorical: it “dehistoricized” morality. It posited a morality that was uniform in all ages, not dependent on any particular revelation, watermarked onto the fabric of our nature, and accessible merely by the light of reason. Even so, natural religion played an important role in the secular historiographical turn in eighteenth-century England. There was in fact an organic relationship between the two, one that historians have failed to articulate. Precisely because natural religion was thought to rest on timeless and universally valid rational foundations, it became possible to treat traditional religion (meaning above all, but not only, Christianity) as a subject of secular historical study, in the sense that it was subject to the same laws of historical knowledge and historical development as all other subjects of historical study, and left no room for miracles. A central figure in this conceptual relationship was Conyers Middleton, a once-famous, now-obscure Cambridge librarian. Middleton's account of natural religion has been swamped by the attention lavished on Matthew Tindal, and his turn to secular historiography lies in the shadows cast by Edward Gibbon. Yet Middleton played a crucial and distinctive role in laying historiographical foundations without which Gibbon could not have written as he did. His understanding of natural religion differed from that of other participants in the “deist controversy” in ultimately far-reaching ways. Those differences explain why he could treat Cicero as a kind of saint in the church of natural religion, reversing, as it were, the elevation of the Bible above Cicero that Augustine had put into effect at the beginning of medieval history. They explain above all why Middleton could approach the history of Christianity in a manner that anticipated both Voltaire and Gibbon and made their historical writings possible.