Cables in Cipher,the Raoul Wallenberg Case and Swedish–Soviet Diplomatic Communication 1944–1947

In 2011, the Russian government, in order to mark the 100th anniversary of Swedish Diplomat Raoul Wallenberg, decided to allow one Swedish researcher to go through the diplomatic correspondence in cipher between the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm and the Soviet Foreign Ministry during the years 1944–1947. This article presents some of the major findings on Wallenberg and discusses whether parallel paths of Soviet encrypted communication between Moscow and Stockholm may still be harbouring additional information on his case. The ciphers cannot provide us with any conclusive answers on the Soviet motives for arresting Wallenberg, or his ultimate fate. They do, however, provide us with unique insights into how the matter was handled on both the Soviet and Swedish sides.     

The Efficacies of Heritage: Syndromes,Magics, and Possessional Acts

In this paper I present critical insights into the efficacies of heritage. I take the phenomenon of the Jerusalem Syndrome (JS) as my point of departure and recast it as Heritage Syndrome (HS). I do this to better understand how such efficacies are experienced and materialized in ritual possessional acts. As a framework, the JS reveals the power and potency that reside in experiences of collapse. Such disembedding events activate subsequent ritual dramas (whether malign/benign or successful/failed) of world-making, redemption, repair, and renewal. Heritage quests as ritual ‘sacred dramas’ and ‘practical magics’ are I argue, similarly experienced in the collapse of known categories: imagined/real, extraordinary/mundane, possessing/being possessed, and crucially what heritage is versus what heritage does. Writ large, heritage efficacies are bound-up in the breakdown and blurring of boundaries — and thus the non-distinction — between heritage in the conventional sense and other dynamics such as magic, prophecy, and well-being/ill-being. These reveal alternative pathways, potentialities, and patterns of behaviour that demonstrate that dominant, elite, rationalized approaches to heritage banalize heritage efficacies and can thus be termed a failed project. I argue that conceiving of heritage as a syndrome — and critically as a movement away from medical pathologization and towards a recasting of heritages as diverse constellations of cultural-spiritual-magical-emotional experiences and engagements — better reflects the deeply felt complex and transformative practices at play. These heritage rites distinguished at points by those who wish their lives were more dramatic and those who wish their lives were less traumatic better describe how the vast majority of global actors engage with heritage, notably at popular, grass-roots level and in contexts of extremis, yet its significance goes largely unrecognized and unvalued.     

Heinrich Klüver and the temporal lobe syndrome*

Abstract

Heinrich Klüver and Paul Bucy described a constellation of symptoms in monkeys following large resections of the temporal lobe that they termed the “temporal lobe syndrome”; now commonly referred to as the Klüver‐Bucy syndrome. The aim of this paper is threefold: (1) to review Heinrich Klüver's behavioral studies on monkeys that led up to his temporal lobe experiments with Paul Bucy; (2) to understand why Brown and Schäfer dismissed the behavioral changes in temporal lobe monkeys they had observed fifty years prior to the studies of Klüver and Bucy; and (3) to show that Klüver's phenomenologically motivated conceptual paradigm helped to unify both neuropsychological and neuroanatomical theories regarding the visual and emotive functions of the non‐human primate temporal lobe.     

‘All Signs Indicate that Gestapo Agents Murdered Him’: Soviet Disinformation,the Katyn massacre and the Raoul Wallenberg Case, 1945–7

In the years 1945–52, that is, between Raoul Wallenberg's incarceration in the Lubianka prison in Moscow (6 February 1945) and the first Swedish demand for his return (11 February 1952), more than fifty people provided the Swedish Foreign Ministry with diffuse and often contradictory information about his whereabouts. This article argues that a number of these testimonies may have been part of a Soviet campaign of disinformation aimed at diverting the Swedes' attention away from Moscow and to have them believe that Wallenberg had died in Hungary. The appearance of messages to this effect by February–March 1945 may indicate that the Soviets had already decided at this early point never to let Wallenberg return alive, or at least to construct an option that would allow for such a decision. In August 1947, after twenty-six Swedish diplomatic approaches on account of Wallenberg over the course of two and a half years, the Soviets handed over a note signed by Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinskii that declared that Wallenberg had presumably died in Hungary. The note had the desired effect. No Swedish diplomatic approaches on Wallenberg were made for the next five years. This article argues that the Vyshinskii note was an extraordinary measure taken by the Soviets finally to get the message of Wallenberg's death in Hungary through to the Swedes. The Soviet disinformation regarding the 1940 Katyn massacre provides an interesting point of reference for understanding the way in which the Soviets tried to mislead Sweden over Wallenberg.