Simon McBurney’s Ambitious Pursuit of the Pure Maths Play

Abstract

When Simon McBurney set out to create a play about the fabled relationship between Cambridge mathematician G. H. Hardy and the self-taught Indian genius Srinivasa Ramanujan, he was immediately confronted by the question of how to engage the mathematics authentically. Undaunted by his own uneasiness with the subject, McBurney incorporated a host of experts into the rehearsal process, calling on mathematical educators, expositors, and Fields medalists to come work with the company. While on the surface maths and drama make an incongruous pair, the result was a vibrant collaboration. The final product — the award-winning play A Disappearing Number — shines an interesting light on the surprising similarity between the creative process in mathematics and the creative process in theatre, especially as manifested by the company at Complicite.     

Towards the Baghdad Pact: South Asia and Middle East Defence in the Gold War, 19477ndash;1955

This article illustrates US policy on European integration and the European Economic Community (EEC) by focusing on the General Agreement on Tarriff and Trade (GATT) Kennedy Round negotiations (1963–7). However underestimated in the history of international relations, GATT provides in fact an outstanding framework for analysing the foreign policy of its members. Whilst analyses of the Round per se already exist, no scholar thus far has focused on US policy towards European integration. Moreover, no previous author has utilised the European archives and has examined the stances of the EEC. This article shows that US support for European integration, which both Kennedy and Johnson followed at the behest of the ‘Europeanists’ in their respective administrations, conditioned the bargaining position of the United States in Geneva. The US negotiators tried to enhance US trade interests while at the same time attempting to encourage European regional integration. In so doing, the United States played a role in the strengthening of European regional integration by favouring the unity of the area. Moreover, contrary to previous accounts, this article shows that US negotiators were able to direct and move forward a complicated negotiation, showing Washington's leadership. The article concludes by showing that the Kennedy Round ended a period of about twenty years during which the United States acted to promote the unity of Western Europe. At the end of the 1960s, with the worsening of the US economic conditions, the tension in transatlantic relations over monetary and security issues, and the strength that the EEC demonstrated during the Kennedy Round, ‘the Europeanists’ were no longer able to prevail with their line in the internal discussions. This change became apparent when the Nixon administration shifted to a more detached and ambiguous policy towards European integration.     

Searching for a Just and Lasting Peace? Anglo-American Relations and the Road to United Nations Security Council Resolution 242

United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 continues to rank as a key point of reference for the Arab-Israeli peace process. The resolution laid down a ‘land for peace’ formula for the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, under which Israel would withdraw from territories occupied during the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War in exchange for full peace agreements with its Arab neighbours. This article analyses the Anglo-American diplomacy at the United Nations which led to the passing of the resolution. It argues that the policy-making of the Johnson administration was rendered incoherent by internal rivalries and disorganisation. US Ambassador to the UN, Arthur Goldberg, was perceived as excessively sympathetic to Israel by the Arab delegations. The British approach, by contrast, was perceived by all parties as more even-handed. The clear position adopted by Foreign Secretary George Brown on Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, together with the skilful diplomacy of the Ambassador to the UN, Lord Caradon, explains the British success in sponsoring Resolution 242. The episode holds broader lessons for the conduct of Anglo-American relations showing that Britain was better placed to achieve diplomatic success when it retained its freedom of manoeuvre in relations with the United States.     

The Virtue Ethic Difference in the Just War Discourse of James Turner Johnson and Catholic Social Teaching

Abstract

In this article, I investigate how incorporating virtue ethics into the process of interpreting and responding to conflict re-shapes the understanding and application of just war theory. More specifically, I analyze James Turner Johnson's idea of just war and the implications of Thomistic virtue ethics. My argument in this article is that Johnson's rule-based idea of just war theory lacks the more integrated virtue ethic, which we find in Thomas and in the re-appropriation of Thomistic virtue ethics in contemporary Catholic Social Teaching's discourse on just war. This contributes to Johnson's idea of just war being inconsistent with the direction of contemporary Catholic Social Teaching on just war theory, particularly regarding the presumption against war. His lack of a virtue ethic also contributes to an inadequate understanding, development, and application of basic just war criteria, particularly from a Catholic perspective.     

试析约翰逊政府对中美大使级会谈的策略与意图

约翰逊政府时期,美国一方面把中美大使级会谈作为应对批评美国对华政策缺乏灵活性的挡箭牌,把中美僵硬对峙的责任推给中国;另一方面,随着国际局势的变化,开始把中美大使级会谈作为与中国联系的潜在的、有用的渠道,避免两国发生直接武装冲突。约翰逊政府与尼克松政府对会谈的不同立场,说明20世纪60年代中美关系是由美国对华政策决定的,美国在中美关系中占据主导地位。     

Australia’s war in Vietnam: debate without end

Australia’s commitment in Vietnam can be interpreted as a small ally drawing its superpower partner into war for its own ends. Two studies by eminent Australian authors throw light on the role of human agency, and in so doing bring Australian historiography of the war closer to the trend in the United States. Peter Edwards’s history just about describes Vietnam as ‘Menzies War’. However, he finds no new sources on Menzies’s mindset, and diminishes the roles of his foreign ministers, Garfield Barwick and Paul Hasluck. The late Geoffrey Bolton’s intimate biography of Hasluck shows him as an active minister and also that his private papers are thin on Vietnam, the part of his distinguished career on which he never wrote. The Cabinet meeting of 17 December 1964 reveals much more about Australian decision-making on going to war than can be gleaned from Edwards’s cursory treatment and Bolton’s second-hand account. Barwick’s different approach, and even Hasluck’s last-minute caution, show Australia had a choice. Barwick, if he had remained Foreign Minister, might have kept Australia out of the Vietnam war, so freeing it to continue to play a leading regional political role.     

HISTORY GOES WALKABOUT

Could the methods of history—and not just its objects of study—be decolonized? This essay explores analogous areas of cultural production, such as painting, to determine how historians might begin to produce work that lies outside the Western, Euro‐Christian imaginary. It focuses on the case of Australia and the means by which Aboriginal artists have reanimated and recalibrated traditional forms of knowledge, offering new bases for thinking about the history and temporalities of Australia. The work of the painter Tim Johnson is then presented as an example for history in his demonstration of the ways in which indigenous methods and ways of seeing the world can be deployed by Others. The ethical, theoretical, and practical challenges that accompany such work are detailed, alongside a historiographical account of the way in which these discussions mesh with seminal debates in postcolonialism, subaltern studies, and settler colonialism as they relate to historical theory. Drawing on recent work in History and Theory, the article asks: what might be the consequences for history were it not to develop a meaningful “global turn,” arguing that a critical moment has been reached in which modes of understanding the world that come from outside the West need to be incorporated into historians’ repertoires for thinking and making.     

Lester B. Pearson’s Temple University Speech Revisited: The Origins and Evolution of the Proposal for a Bombing Pause

Lester B. Pearson’s speech at Temple University in April 1965 suggesting a pause in the bombing of North Vietnam enraged United States President Lyndon B. Johnson, who in private the next day at Camp David strongly rebuked the Canadian prime minister. While their stormy encounter has become the stuff of legend, just how the controversial proposal for a bombing pause appeared in Pearson’s speech in the first place has received far less attention. Making use of new archival material, including the private diary of Canadian Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs Marcel Cadieux, among other original sources, this article revisits previous accounts of the Temple speech, offering new details on the origins of the proposal for a bombing pause and examining the hitherto unknown but crucial drafting changes that were made prior to its becoming public. In doing so, this article sheds new light on one of the most significant events in the history of Canadian–American relations.     

Time to Say Goodbye

Tim Hortons’ first donut store was established in Hamilton, Ontario, in 1964; other stores were added over time as the chain gradually diffused across Canada to become the country’s largest quick-service restaurant chain with more than 2,400 restaurants. In achieving this dominant status it adopted one of the strategies of any successful restaurant chain; utilizing a uniform architectural style to emphasize to customers the consistency in its menu and operations. This article examines the processes underlying the development of the Tim Hortons brand and the diffusion of its restaurants into the US, specifically the appearance of their restaurants in the Great Lakes borderlands. The study found a consistent architectural style in Ontario but several different styles in Michigan and New York. It is suggested that this lack of consistency in brand identification in its US restaurants is a contributory factor to their lack of profitability and smaller sales.     

The Johnson Club and Late Victorian Literary Culture

In 1902 both the Order of Merit and the British Academy came into being. As David Cannadine has noted, Gladstonian liberals including Lord Rosebery, John Morley and Sir G.O. Trevelyan occupied a key segment of the newly formed elite with several others who were admitted to one or both of the new groups, belonged to the Club, the private society founded by Samuel Johnson and Joshua Reynolds in 1764. In fact several members took a leading part in the negotiations leading to the establishment of the Academy. The article seeks to demonstrate the significance of the Club in promoting what Cannadine terms ‘liberal and literary culture’ in the later nineteenth century. A detailed examination of the membership shows a broad array of high achievers in the arts and sciences, as well as many individuals who held important public office. In particular, the Club elected a remarkable group of distinguished Victorian historians, including Macaulay, Grote, Froude, Lecky, Acton, Maine, Stubbs and Creighton. At the end of the century, several members had served in Gladstone's administrations, and as a solid phalanx of liberal politician/writers they provided the base from which the new recipients of the Order of Merit and Fellows of British Academy would be chosen. My conclusion is that the group held a central place in the intellectual and literary world of Britain around 1900, with its extensive connections to the political power base, and understandably provided a nucleus of members for both the Order of Merit and the British Academy