Preserving the Global Nuclear Order: The Trident Agreements and the Arms Control Debate, 1977–1982

ABSTRACT

The Trident negotiations were a pivotal moment in establishing the US–UK nuclear relationship as an accepted element of the global nuclear order. The Trident agreements marked the first supply of a US delivery system to the UK since the signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the development of Superpower arms control. In turn, the development of these agendas in the international sphere influenced Anglo-American discussions on the replacement to Polaris. The Carter White House procrastinated on the provision of Trident due in part to their concerns over the political ramifications for their wider non-proliferation and arms control goals. However, fortuitously for the UK's nuclear programme, US–UK discussions on the replacement to Polaris coalesced with the reorientation of US foreign policy towards containment of the Soviet Union under Jimmy Carter and then Ronald Reagan – enabling the finalisation of the sale of Trident to the UK. As such, the status of the US–UK nuclear relationship as a broadly accepted element of the global nuclear order is a legacy of the ‘long 1970s’ alongside the early Cold War.     

‘A Tiny Little Footnote in History’: Conservative Centre Forward

In May 1985, two years after he had returned to the back benches, Francis Pym launched the first organised display of dissent within the parliamentary Conservative Party against Margaret Thatcher's leadership: Conservative Centre Forward. Those Conservative MPs who joined the group were very much believers in One Nation Conservatism. Conservative Centre Forward survived for barely a week after going public; it rapidly collapsed amid accusations of disloyalty and inept leadership. The group proved to be a short-lived experiment which achieved little of note and exposed those who were involved to widespread ridicule. Yet, it was precisely because Conservative Centre Forward collapsed so quickly and achieved so little that it was significant. In its own way, the short life of the group provided a revealing commentary upon the character of the mid-1980s Conservative Party. It was a party which, on the one hand, was moving inexorably to the right and therefore ever further away from the values of One Nation Conservatism which Conservative Centre Forward espoused. On the other hand, it was a party which was still traditional enough to view open displays of dissent, of whatever magnitude, as a threat to the unity upon which its continued electoral success depended.     

‘Those European Chicken Littles’: Reagan,NATO, and the Polish Crisis, 1981–2

This article focuses on transatlantic relations in the run-up to and aftermath of the imposition of Martial Law in Poland in December 1981. Through an analysis of British, US, German, and NATO sources, this article highlights the fundamental differences and consequent disagreements that occurred between the Reagan administration and its European allies in 1981–2. It argues that these divergences originated from economic considerations, from a fundamentally discrepant conception of détente on the two sides of the Atlantic, and from the Reagan administration's mismanagement of the crisis. Not only did Reagan disregard NATO's contingency plans dating from 1980 and did not consult the allies, he also designed US sanctions specifically to dash a joint agreement between the Europeans and the Soviet Union for the construction of a pipeline that was to deliver Siberian gas into Western Europe.     

An Opportunistic Anglophobe: Charles J. Haughey,the Irish Government and the Falklands War, 1982

This article examines Irish taoiseach (prime minister) Charles J. Haughey’s involvement with the Falklands War of 1982; a hitherto neglected subject related to a defining episode in the history of Great Britain in the post-war era. Specifically, it focuses on Haughey’s relationship with British prime minister Margaret Thatcher during the depths of this crisis and the immediate diplomatic and political fallout between the British and Irish governments in the aftermath of the Falklands War. At the heart of this article is the argument that Haughey’s modus operandi during the Falkland War was motivated by a blend of political opportunism and cynical anglophobia.     

‘The Anglo-Irish Agreement put us on side with the Americans’: Margaret Thatcher,Anglo-American relations and the path to the Anglo-Irish Agreement, 1979-1985

ABSTRACT

This article offers a critical re-evaluation of British prime minister, Margaret Thatcher’s relationship with U.S president, Jimmy Carter (1977–1981) and his successor, Ronald Reagan (1981–1989), in the context of the Northern Ireland conflict from 1979 to 1985. Specifically, it examines the impact that the ‘Irish Question’ had on the changing nature of Anglo-American relations from Thatcher’s entry to No. 10 Downing Street in May 1979 to the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) in November 1985.     

‘If ah’ve goat’i choose between putting shoes on ma bairn’s feet and payin’ this bill,ah’m puttin’ shoes on ma bairn’s feet’ – poverty and the poll tax

ABSTRACT

The poll tax was a key episode in British politics. The widespread opposition campaign has been described as an important expression of Scottish political and national opposition to Thatcherism. The historiographical focus on Glasgow has been influential in this interpretation. By broadening the focus to other Scottish geographies, this article challenges this portrayal and highlights the lived experience of poverty that underpinned resistance and gave political discourses their power. By reframing the argument through the lens of poverty it develops an alternative understanding of the causes of the tax, inverting the narrative that suggests political discourses drove resistance.