Sectarian identity and national identity in the Middle East

This article looks at modern sectarian (here referring to Sunni/Shi'a) identities and their interaction with nationalism in the Middle East. In doing so I make three interrelated claims: 1) the term ‘sectarianism’ is distortive and analytically counterproductive. A better understanding of modern sectarian identity requires us to jettison the term. 2) Once discarded, our focus can then shift to sectarian identity: how it is constructed, perceived, utilized and so forth. A holistic understanding of sectarian identity must recognize the multiple fields upon which it is constructed and contested. The model adopted here frames sectarian identity as simultaneously operating on four fields: doctrinal, subnational, transnational and, crucially for our purposes, the national dimension. 3) Thirdly, this article challenges the assumptions regarding national and sectarian identities in the modern Middle East. Contrary to conventional wisdom, modern sectarian identities are deeply embedded in the prism of the nation‐state and are inextricably linked to nationalism and national identity. The article will rely primarily on the example of modern Iraq but, as will be seen, the Iraqi example is significantly echoed in the cases of Bahrain, Syria and Lebanon.     

The Roots and Achievements of the Early Proto‐Sunni Movement: A Profile and Interpretation

In recent years, the term “proto‐Sunni” has become common in scholarship on the early centuries of Islam. Drawing on categories developed by Peter Berger, this study seeks to move toward a more inclusive portrait of the early proto‐Sunni movement and a more organic understanding of the movement's success. It argues that owing to the erosion of several of the “plausibility structures” of earliest Islam, three tendencies emerged among the proto‐Sunnis between the early 8^th and mid‐9^th centuries C.E.: proto‐Sunnis as traditionist ?ulamā?, proto‐Sunnis as pious ascetics, and proto‐Sunnis as volunteer holy warriors. The prestige acquired through their activities in these areas enabled the early proto‐Sunnis to “objectify” and “legitimize” new plausibility structures which would prove decisive to an eventual Sunni consensus.     

The state,identity politics and ethnic boundaries in Afghanistan: The case of Sunni Hazaras

In recent years, a growing number of activists in Afghanistan have been proactively self-identifying as Sunni Hazaras. The trend demonstrates an important shift that illuminates how ethnic boundaries may change and evolve in response to elite politics and state policies in Afghanistan. Many of the communities that are the subjects of new collective identity discourses share important commonalities, including shared belief in a common origin, with the Shi'a Hazaras. However, because the Shi'a Hazaras were persecuted and marginalised under successive regimes in Afghanistan, it was not common for these communities to publicly identify as Hazaras. Instead, they tended to identify with local identity categories such as those based on places of origin or as Tajiks because, like most Tajiks, they speak Dari and practise Sunni Islam. This article contributes to understanding these dynamics through a detailed examination of the National Council of the Sunni Hazaras of Afghanistan. Taking a social constructivist approach, it develops an argument that emphasises an interactive process between state formation and top-down programmes of national identity construction and bottom-up resistance by groups that appropriate and articulate ethnic and other forms of ethnic identities to demand political representation and symbolic recognition.