‘Drawing the line’ in El Salvador: Washington confronts insurgency in El Salvador, 1979–92

The United States’ intervention in the Salvadoran Civil War, 1979–92, represented the largest nation-building effort launched by Washington between the end of Vietnam and the second war with Iraq. Washington deployed US Special Forces advisers to El Salvador to prevent further human rights abuses, emphasise the importance of winning the affection of civilians, and professionalise and reform the Salvadoran military. Overall, the intervention produced mixed results, including a negotiated settlement. Despite reservations about the efficacy of US policy, lessons from El Salvador have been reapplied elsewhere, including most recently in Iraq.     

Preserving the Global Nuclear Order: The Trident Agreements and the Arms Control Debate, 1977–1982

ABSTRACT

The Trident negotiations were a pivotal moment in establishing the US–UK nuclear relationship as an accepted element of the global nuclear order. The Trident agreements marked the first supply of a US delivery system to the UK since the signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the development of Superpower arms control. In turn, the development of these agendas in the international sphere influenced Anglo-American discussions on the replacement to Polaris. The Carter White House procrastinated on the provision of Trident due in part to their concerns over the political ramifications for their wider non-proliferation and arms control goals. However, fortuitously for the UK's nuclear programme, US–UK discussions on the replacement to Polaris coalesced with the reorientation of US foreign policy towards containment of the Soviet Union under Jimmy Carter and then Ronald Reagan – enabling the finalisation of the sale of Trident to the UK. As such, the status of the US–UK nuclear relationship as a broadly accepted element of the global nuclear order is a legacy of the ‘long 1970s’ alongside the early Cold War.     

‘Those European Chicken Littles’: Reagan,NATO, and the Polish Crisis, 1981–2

This article focuses on transatlantic relations in the run-up to and aftermath of the imposition of Martial Law in Poland in December 1981. Through an analysis of British, US, German, and NATO sources, this article highlights the fundamental differences and consequent disagreements that occurred between the Reagan administration and its European allies in 1981–2. It argues that these divergences originated from economic considerations, from a fundamentally discrepant conception of détente on the two sides of the Atlantic, and from the Reagan administration's mismanagement of the crisis. Not only did Reagan disregard NATO's contingency plans dating from 1980 and did not consult the allies, he also designed US sanctions specifically to dash a joint agreement between the Europeans and the Soviet Union for the construction of a pipeline that was to deliver Siberian gas into Western Europe.     

Modern Liberty and the Moral Contents of Life: An Introduction to the Political Reflection of Pierre Manent

Abstract

Robert Faulkner's The Case for Greatness offers a lively, detailed discussion of Aristotle's magnanimous man and the statesman who embodies this ethical–political ideal. Faulkner's portrayal of the complexity and tensions within this classical portrait of magnanimity and in the souls of its ancient and modern exemplars is compelling, but missing from his discussion is any mention of magnanimity in the Jewish and Christian intellectual traditions and the resources they afford to mitigate and heal these tensions and provide an openness to fuller wholeness and happiness. One of these resources is the virtue of humility, which is discussed here as a support and a supplement to magnanimity. Various statesmen who seem to incarnate this humble yet arguably more magnanimous magnanimity are noted in the last sections of this essay.     

Ronald Reagan,the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign and the Nuclear scare of the 1980s

This article examines the Reagan's administration response to the nuclear scare and the ensuing antinuclear mobilization of the early 1980s. Specifically, it analyses the interaction between the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign (NWFC) and the Administration's Nuclear Arms Control Information Policy Group (NACIPIG), the ad hoc interdepartmental group created in order to counter the NWFC's influence on public opinion and regain control of the debate on nuclear arms negotiations. By looking simultaneously at the NACIPIG's records and the nuclear freeze campaign documents, the article analyses the interplay between the movement and the executive branch, aiming at understand how the White House responded to the domestic antinuclear challenge and in which way the movement influenced public opinion and affected in the end policy-making. The purpose is to offer a nuanced understanding of the role played by the antinuclear movement that, through its pressure on the U.S. public opinion and Congress, induced Reagan first to temper his bellicose rhetoric and then to alter his negotiating strategy with the Soviets.     

‘The Anglo-Irish Agreement put us on side with the Americans’: Margaret Thatcher,Anglo-American relations and the path to the Anglo-Irish Agreement, 1979-1985

ABSTRACT

This article offers a critical re-evaluation of British prime minister, Margaret Thatcher’s relationship with U.S president, Jimmy Carter (1977–1981) and his successor, Ronald Reagan (1981–1989), in the context of the Northern Ireland conflict from 1979 to 1985. Specifically, it examines the impact that the ‘Irish Question’ had on the changing nature of Anglo-American relations from Thatcher’s entry to No. 10 Downing Street in May 1979 to the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) in November 1985.