Trump’s populism: lessons from Latin America

This paper compares left-wing Latin American populism with Donald Trump. Despite their different social bases and economic policies, they use a similar logic to construct politics as an antagonistic struggle between two camps. Left-wing and right-wing populists aim to rupture existing political institutions to give power to the people, yet they differ in how they construct this category. Whereas Trump used ethnic criteria to differentiate the people from three out groups – Mexicans, Muslims, and African-American militant organisations – left-wing Latin American populists used political and socio-economic criteria. Despite their democratising promises, Latin American populists like Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and Rafael Correa in Ecuador undermined democracy from within. Even though stronger institutions might protect American democracy, Trump has disfigured democracy.     

Insurgents against Brussels: Euroscepticism and the right-wing populist turn of the Lega Nord since 2013

Under the leadership of Matteo Salvini, the Lega Nord has shifted away from its previous political identity as a voice for Italy’s north and has placed hostility towards the policies and institutions of the European Union (EU) at the heart of its rhetoric. Nowadays, the enemy is Rome no longer: it is Brussels, European institutions, and the threat to the national sovereignty posed by the EU. Borrowing from the Italian political philosopher Nicola Matteucci, we would describe Salvini’s Lega as a ‘populist insurgency’. That is to say, it is a populist party that marries the traditional populist evocation of the virtues of the people against the corrupt elites, with a pervasive glibness of analysis.     

The spatial encounter between neoliberalism and populism in Taiwan: Regional restructuring under the DPP regime in the new millennium

This paper aims to explore the unevenness of spatial development under the rule of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) of Taiwan, after the collapse of the one-party dominance of the Kuomintang (KMT) in the 2000 presidential election. In the late 1980s the KMT engineered the rise of big business groups and consortia with the introduction of its neoliberalization project. To remain in power, the DPP regime continued to implement this neoliberalization project to win the political loyalties and donations from emerging business groups and show a dedication to economic development, while resorting to the populist practice of transferring resources to the local society, particularly winning precincts, to consolidate its advantage and further crumble the KMT bastions. Consequently, Taiwan was a “vacillated state”, pulled and dragged between the pro-growth neoliberalization project and calls for a populist redistribution of resources. This resulted in a new political dynamic in which the urban regions were tied closely with the global economic growth while the rural regions were closely tied to domestic resource allocation. As the developmental model of state would predict, this contradictory co-existence of neoliberalism and populism led to a decline in state policy effectiveness.     

The People's Climate March: Environmental populism as political genre

Contemporary political ecological research on populism has demonstrated how authoritarian and strongarm tactics come to be hitched to reductive symbolic representations of “the people,” often with disastrous environmental impacts. Advocates of “left-populism” argue that such research can give the erroneous impression that “populism” and “authoritarianism” are essentially synonymous. Skeptical of formalist arguments, Gramscians argue that populism, as a quite variegated and fundamentally spatial phenomenon, must be viewed historically, in situ. But all three arguments share a quick assessment of populism, without always attending to its embedded multiplicity. Bringing together insights from Stuart Hall and Lauren Berlant, this article seeks to expand geographical understandings of the dynamic forms and styles of environmental politics by proposing thinking of populism as a political genre. This theoretical schema helps to cut through formalist versus historicist debates while directing attention to the affective scenes through which populism is performed. In order to demonstrate the utility of examining populism's genre and scenes, I examine political essays written surrounding the 2014 People’s Climate March. Essays debated activist expectations concerning political subjectivity, tactics, scales of action, signifiers, and aesthetics for best confronting global inequality and the climate crisis alike. Through contesting the meaning of “the people” and “populism,” divergent leftist political interpretations both repeated and tweaked generic populist forms. By examining the performative construction and contestation of “the people” through languages and spaces of climate action, I advocate a humble yet still critical political ecological approach to understanding contemporary populism.     

俄国近代政治恐怖主义的源流

俄国近代政治恐怖主义被视为近现代国际恐怖主义之源,而涅恰耶夫被视为政治恐怖主义的“鼻祖”。他的极端主义的理论思想、政治主张和活动方式,不仅对19世纪七八十年代俄国的社会政治运动,而且对民意党和社会革命党,都产生了极其重要的影响。而民意党和社会革命党的恐怖主义理论、组织原则、宣传和行动方式,则为当代国际恐怖主义组织所继承。     

Australian foreign policy in political time: middle power creativity,misplaced friendships,and crises of leadership

Over the past century, Australian foreign policy orders have been stabilised by the construction of ideas that have reduced uncertainty regarding national interests. Yet, such ideas have often evolved in ways that have engendered misplaced certainty, renewed instability, and crisis. To explain such shifts, I highlight the role of an Australian ‘pragmatic liberal tradition’, one which has enabled alternating tendencies to principled stability or technocratic hubris. In a tripartite model, I trace stages over initial ‘middle power’ efforts to construct ideas that lead states—and particularly great powers—to identify interests in cooperation, misplaced certainty in great power ties which obscures new challenges, and the construction of crises that impede or enable change. Empirically, I apply this framework to the construction, conversion, and crises of the ongoing ‘Reform order’. These span the initial Hawke-era middle power integration of US and regional ties, Howard-era misplaced certainty in US-styled neoconservative bandwagoning and neoliberal macroeconomic accommodation, and evolving constructions of the War on Terror and Global Financial Crisis. In the conclusion, I address theoretical and policy implications, highlighting the initial challenges that crises can pose for middle power leadership, and the subsequent scope for creativity.     

Propositions on right-wing populism: Available,excessive, optimistic

Every discourse on right-wing populism is, more or less explicitly, a discourse on affect. From claims that right-wing populism emerges from a background of racialized resentment or the anger of the ‘left behind’, through to analyses of how populist politicians mobilized hatred and rage in a ‘post-truth era’, attempts to explain the emergence and electoral success of contemporary right-wing populism have centered affect. In the midst of the turbulence of post 2007 financial crisis politics, the discourse on right-wing populism has repeated the tensions and ambivalences that surround affective politics per se – with populism simultaneously serving as a warning of what an affect-based politics might become, whilst also seeming to offer a lesson for the liberal-left in how to mobilize and move people otherwise disaffected. In this paper we supplement this attention to affect, and step outside of this tensed relation, by articulating the structure of feeling of contemporary right-wing populism in the U.S.A and UK. We do so through the form of the proposition, finding in the proposition a style of inhabiting an impasse that (re/dis)orientates attention and opens up disagreement and further discussion. In the first proposition - populism is available – we explore questions of definition, settling on how the discursive emptiness of populism allows for its constant articulation. Populism is excessive – the second proposition – shifts to emphasizing the affective fullness of populism, following how this fullness plays out in registers such as fun. Our third proposition – populism is optimistic – argues that right-wing populism is dependent on a ‘temporal loop’ optimism where the future to come blurs with the past that was. We conclude with some reflections on the future of this affect structure in light of the January 2021 events in the US Capitol and the electoral defeat of Donald J Trump.     

Spatial variation in populist right voting in Austria, 2013–2017

The recent wave of populism sweeping Europe and the Americas generated considerable interest among political scientists, economists, sociologists and to some extent, geographers. The vast majority of these studies focuses on individual voter decisions or national comparisons over time but neglects the within-country spatial variation of the populist vote. This paper addresses this shortcoming and applies spatial econometric techniques to explore possible explanations for spatial variation in the increase of the populist right vote between the 2013 and 2017 national elections in Austria for 2118 municipalities. Spatial variation in voting shares can result from (1) compositional effects, regional differences in the composition of voters with different characteristics, (2) broad spatial, historically evolved institutional differences, such as membership to one of the nine states, (3) unequal integration of different types of regions into the global economy, such as peripheral regions, central urban regions, old industrial regions or tourist areas, (4) spatial vote spillovers due to localized social networks, and (5) unobserved spatial processes. We find that the populist right vote gains in Austrian municipalities are affected by all processes, but that the type of regions becomes insignificant once we correct for unobservable spatial structures in the regression framework. The increase in the share of foreigners, the share of foreigners, income and inequality levels, educational differences, selected state membership, as well as spatial spillovers of populist right voting are all important to explain spatial variation in the rise of the populist right vote.