Late pleistocene human adaptations in eastern North America

Eastern North America in late Pleistocene times was characterized by two major environmental regions: a periglacial tundra or open spruce parkland and an extensive complex boreal/deciduous forest in the unglaciated, lower latitudes. These environments selected for different adaptive strategies on the part of human foraging groups—known archaeologically as Paleoindians. Those in the tundra and tundra-forest region were highly mobile, possibly specialized hunters, exploiting caribou; those in the forest were generalists, exploiting a variety of subsistence resources with a less mobile settlement system. There is little evidence in either area for hunting of Pleistocene megafauna. These differences in adaptive strategies are reflected in the record of sites and isolated fluted points scattered throughout the region, as well as aspects of tool technology, function, and patterns of stone use.     

Sapwood estimates in the interpretation of tree-ring dates

Many timber finds lack some or all of the outer, sapwood rings formed in the years just before felling. In order to estimate felling date once the outermost remaining ring has been dated, it is necessary to estimate the number of sapwood rings originally present. Methods doing this for oak are reviewed in the light of an intensive study of living trees at one site and an extensive study of 175 samples from living trees in North Wales and northwest England. Some methods reported in the literature are found to be invalid. A method reported by Hollstein (1965) is most reliable, with modifications for known variations in sapwood number with position in the tree. At present the best available estimate is that a value of 30 sapwood rings be used (95% confidence limits: 19–50).     

Norse Animal Husbandry in Liminal Environments: Stable Isotope Evidence from the Scottish North Atlantic Islands

ABSTRACT

This paper employs δ¹³C and δ¹⁵N analysis of bone collagen to explore animal management at large Norse settlement sites in the liminal environments of the Scottish North Atlantic Islands. The Norse period was a time of social, cultural and economic change; the need to feed an expanding population and the demand for trade meant that domestic stock were a crucial resource. Our results indicate that rearing animals in these challenging insular environments required careful management. At all sites, the diet and movement of domestic cattle and sheep were highly similar and carefully controlled and, despite many of the analysed settlements lying close to the coast, there was no use of shorefront grazing or fodder resources. In contrast, pig rearing strategies varied across the island groups. In the Western Isles pig diets were diverse, indicative of household or ad hoc management, whilst on Orkney all pigs consumed a more restricted diet based primarily on terrestrial protein. A comparison of red deer with domestic stock on the Western Isles indicates that both groups were exploiting similar grazing niches.     

Middle power,status-seeking and role conceptions: the cases of Indonesia and South Korea

This article examines how role theory can enhance the middle-power literature in understanding the role preferences of middle powers. Rather than treating it as merely a function of material capability or good international citizenship, this article resituates middle power as a concept of international status that states aim to pursue through the enactment of role conceptions. Thus, it reinstates a conceptual distinction between ‘middle-power status’ and ‘middle-power roles’. The article suggests that the notion of role conceptions can analytically connect the status-seeking behaviour of middle powers with their foreign policy agenda. In so doing, it provides a more nuanced explanation of middle-power behaviour, which might differ between one middle power and another. Using Indonesia and South Korea as case studies of middle power, this article contends that foreign policymakers have strategically conceptualised and enacted several main roles that aim to capture historical experience, as well as ego and alter expectations, in order to pursue middle-power status. These role conceptions determine the foreign policy agenda of states in articulating their middle-power status.     

Revised conodont and fusuline biostratigraphy of the Bamchi Formation (Pyongan Supergroup) at the Bamchi section,Yeongwol and the Carboniferous–Permian boundary in South Korea

Wang, Q., Wang, Y., Qi, Y., Wang, X., Choh, S.J., Lee, D.C. & Lee, D.J., November 2017. Yeongwol and the Carboniferous–Permian boundary in South Korea. Alcheringa 42, 245–258. ISSN 0311-5518

Six conodont and one fusuline zones are recognized on basis of a total of 25 conodont and 13 fusuline species (including seven unidentified species or species given with cf. or aff. in total) from the Bamchi Formation, Yeongwol, Korea. The conodont zones include the Streptognathodus bellus, S. isolatus, S. cristellaris, S. sigmoidalis, S. fusus and S. barskovi zones in ascending order, which can be correlated with the conodont zones spanning the uppermost Gzhelian to Asselian Age of the Permian globally. The fusuline zone is named the Rugosofusulina complicata–Pseudoschwagerina paraborealis zone. The co-occurrence of the conodont Streptognathodus isolatus (the Global Boundary Stratotype Section and Point index for the base of Permian) and Pseudoschwagerina (a Permian inflated fusuline) indicates that the Carboniferous–Permian boundary can be placed in the lower part of the Bamchi Formation in South Korea.

Qiulai Wang* [qlwang@nigpas.ac.cn] CAS Key Laboratory of Economic Stratigraphy and Palaeogeography, Nanjing Institute of Geology and Palaeontology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, East Beijing Road 39, Nanjing 210008, PR China; Yue Wang* [yuewang@nigpas.ac.cn] LPS, Nanjing Institute of Geology and Palaeontology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, East Beijing Road 39, Nanjing 210008, PR China; Yuping Qi* [ypqi@nigpas.ac.cn] Xiangdong Wang* [xdwang@nigpas.ac.cn] CAS Key Laboratory of Economic Stratigraphy and Palaeogeography, Nanjing Institute of Geology and Palaeontology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, East Beijing Road 39, Nanjing 210008, PR China; Suk-Joo Choh [sjchoh@korea.ac.kr] Department of Earth and Environmental Sciences, Korea University, Seoul 02841, Republic of Korea; Dong-Chan Lee [dclee@chungbuk.ac.kr] Department of Earth Sciences Education, Chungbuk National University, Cheongju 28644, Republic of Korea; Dong-Jin Lee [djlee@andong.ac.kr] Department of Earth and Environmental Sciences, Andong National University, Andong 36729, Republic of Korea. *Also affiliated with: University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, 19A Yuquan Road, Shijingshan District, Beijing 100049, PR China.     

States of Insecurity

Under Communism, Albania and North Korea rejected de-Stalinisation, clung to leader cults, and, after the acrimonious break between Moscow and Beijing, championed ‘self-reliance’. Often mentioned in passing, the Albanian–North Korean parallel has seldom been analysed. This article highlights three aspects that shaped the Communist regimes' insecurity: the social dynamics of war and early threats; the challenge presented by de-Stalinisation in 1956; and the momentous Sino–Soviet split in the early 1960s. Like the boisterous language of Marxism-Leninism and the drive to engineer a non-capitalist society, insecurity was also built into the Communist international system. Clinging to Stalinist methods, then, was also a reflection of the self-destructive potential of calls for reforming the Communist system, which threatened to tear the Eastern bloc apart. Tirana and Pyongyang pursued different paths to ‘self-reliance’, yet they could not help speaking a similar language and facing similar problems. North Korea ultimately joined the Non-Aligned Movement but achieved little success in the Third World. The irony is that tiny, isolated Albania, which shunned the Movement, ultimately ended up non-aligned: violently critical of Moscow, Beijing, and Washington, and distrustful of practically everyone else.     

Neoliberalism,the Developmental State and Civil Society in Korea

Following the Asian economic crisis of the late 1990s, some scholars predicted that the introduction of neoliberal ideas and policies would result in the definitive passing of the Korean developmental state. Despite these predictions, Korean state elites have retained their influential position as economic managers by, for instance, practicing a revised form of industrial policy. Neoliberal reform has, however, had significant social implications. Rather than neoliberalism acting as a democratising force that curtails the power of the state, this article illustrates that the Korean state has used the reform agenda to justify an expansion of its powers. The state presented itself as an agent capable of resolving long-standing economic problems, and of defending law and order. By doing so, the state reduced the political space available to non-state actors. The article concludes that for some states, neoliberalism is a means of retaining economic and political influence, and that former developmental states may be particularly adept at co-opting elements of civil society into governing alliances.     

China’s Evolving Policy towards the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea under Xi Jinping

Despite international pressure to condemn North Korea (DPRK), China’s successive leaderships have dealt carefully with Pyongyang, especially vis-à-vis its nuclear weapons program. This moderate stance reflects the two countries’ decades-long relationship, summarised in the Chinese idiom that Pyongyang and Beijing are “as close as lips and teeth”. Nevertheless, the DPRK’s third nuclear test in February 2013 raised enormous challenges for the new Xi Jinping leadership to maintain the previous DPRK policy focused on the status quo and stability on the Korean Peninsula. China’s attitudes and policies towards the DPRK after the provocative third test signified a possible reorientation of Beijing’s DPRK policy. This generated repercussions in the countries concerned and prompted debates among experts. This article asks how these events should be understood and what their implications are for the Xi leadership’s policy on the DPRK, the stability of the Korean Peninsula, and Northeast Asia. Given China’s competitive relations with other major powers, we conclude that the Xi leadership will not abandon the DPRK; indeed it will reinforce the policy of strengthening China’s influence over it. Nonetheless one aspect of doing so will involve China opening up to other – cooperative, multilateral – approaches to reinforcing stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia.     

A Path to “Emergent Peace” in Northeast Asia: The Shadow of the Past Matters

This article explores the possibility of institutional multilateralism in Northeast Asia from the perspective of “emergent peace”. The main argument of the article is that a self-organising peace process arising from institutional multilateralism is constrained and enabled by the existing “morphogenetic fields”, the formative social spheres of collective action. Similar ideas or initiatives that are pursued by an agent/agents may result in different consequences depending on the characteristics of the morphogenetic fields. This argument is examined through two case studies. The first is Jean Monnet in Europe, who played a pivotal role in the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), and the other is Ahn Jung-geun in Northeast Asia, who proposed the detailed ideas of pan-Asianism akin to Monnet but failed to play a role as an agent. The case studies demonstrate that the feature of the morphogenetic fields is determined by the characteristics of embedded agency at a critical juncture, while the agency is bounded by the particular spatial and temporal conditions of the morphogenetic fields. In search of an emergent peace process in Northeast Asia, this article particularly highlights the Six-Party Talks, arguing that they are a by-product of, and an alternative to, the San Francisco System.     

Migration,the Urban Periphery,and the Politics of Migrant Lives

This paper explores the politics of migration through a focus on labor migration regimes and the urban lives of migrants in the Seoul Metropolitan Region of South Korea. In particular, it draws attention to the ways in which migrant lives highlight the limits of the contemporary emphasis on control in migration management regimes. The paper contends that while migration management certainly reworks the socio‐legal status of migrants, the desire for control is often displaced in the everyday presence and practices of migrants as urban residents. In order to develop this argument I focus on the notion of the urban periphery as a spatio‐temporal configuration that manifests marginalization but is also potentially generative, innovative and destabilizing. The paper proceeds by exploring three dimensions of the periphery: (1) the mobile commons that emerges in everyday life; (2) the process of becoming undocumented and the subversion of control; and (3) the tactics of recognition that challenge the peripheral location of migrants. In each case the focus on the urban periphery draws attention to the importance of visibility and invisibility in migration, to the uneven spatio‐temporal configuration of migrant lives in the city, and to the ways in which migrant desires constitute a politics that exceeds what is normatively expected of them.