Exceptionalising democratic dissent: a study of the JNU event and its representations

This article analyses the politics around the infamous Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) ‘sedition’ case of February 2016, focusing particularly on its media representations. It shows how the case was, from its outset, embroiled in the politics of representation, with questions of truth and lies receding into the background to give way to clashes of opinion – however unfounded they may have been in information, fact or truth – broadly reflecting the nature of the public sphere in these ‘post-truth’ times. Further, it analyses how the protests at JNU following the event sought to project an image of the university countering right-wing representations, while also enriching debates on nationalism, democracy, dissent and freedom of speech. It concludes by showing how the hostile representations of JNU fitted well with overall politics, combining the hyper-nationalism and neoliberalism, promoted by the current regime led by the Bharatiya Janata Party and the right-wing Hindu nationalist and supremacist paramilitary volunteer organisation, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh.     

Mountbatten and India, 1948–64

This article brings to light Lord Mountbatten's continuing links with India after 1948 - a neglected aspect of his life and career. It probes his involvement and influence in Indian affairs through his personal relationships and professional experience. In doing so, it presents Mountbatten as the personification of the change in Indo-British ties from those of empire to dominion and beyond. On the three key issues of Hyderabad, arms sales, and Kashmir, this article evaluates his role as a ‘friend of India’ in the West as well as a conduit for the British government(s) of the day to reach out to Nehru. Considering the scope and limits of ‘influence of friendship, it shows that Mountbatten remained characteristically involved in India after his departure and this was appreciated by both Nehru and his British counterparts. Mountbatten epitomised the old ties, which continued to bind India to Britain, after the empire and through the Commonwealth. His views were offered and sought; how much they influenced remains a matter of emphasis, but that he was involved cannot be denied. The weakening of Mountbatten's involvement and influence after Jawaharlal Nehru's death in 1964 represented the wider, generational weakening of Indo-British association.     

A Liberal Ghost? The Left,Liberal Democracy and the Legacy of Harold Laski’s Teaching

ABSTRACT

This article explores the ways in which British socialism may have supported and strengthened liberal ideas held by postcolonial leaders who were educated in Britain. It attempts to do so by examining the role of liberalism in Harold Laski’s teaching at the London School of Economics and Political Science (1920–50), with particular attention to his Indian students. Laski, a self-declared Marxist, promoted socialism in his voluminous writings, frequent speeches, and in his lectures, which were attended by many future post-colonial leaders. Although often rigid in its adhesion to socialist dogma, Laski’s thought nevertheless reflected the malleability of political ideologies, incorporating liberal and pluralist elements in its makeup, which were in turn conveyed to students. This article focuses on how two former pupils, G.L. Mehta and Renuka Ray, responded to Laski’s thinking in the context of early Nehruvian India. Drawing on students’ lecture notes, political writings and assessments of their former professor, I suggest that Laski, and British socialism more generally, served to both radicalise students’ desire for economic planning while moderating their understanding of how to generate political change by reinforcing liberal norms, including a belief in constitutionalism and representative government.     

New Delhi’s All-India War Memorial (India Gate): Death,Monumentality and the Lasting Legacy of Empire in India

This paper traces the colonial and postcolonial histories of one of India’s most iconic structures, New Delhi’s All-India War Memorial. Designed and built by Edwin Lutyens immediately after the Great War, the memorial commemorated both Indian soldiers who had died in defence of the empire and the reason for such human sacrifice. As such the memorial reaffirmed and celebrated Britain and India’s unbreakable imperial bond, now strengthened by the fiery crucible of war. After independence in 1947, India took ownership of the memorial by renaming it India Gate to symbolise the country’s transition from what it had been to what it was becoming through India’s passion to be free. In the process, the memorial was re-evaluated and re-imagined in ways that transformed this site of unwelcome colonial memory into one of India’s most important symbols of national renewal. And yet this new interpretation remained as highly contested and problematic as its original colonial meaning. While the memorial became a site of national cohesion for many, it also perpetuated a colonial politics of division along communal (religious) and inter-communal (caste) lines that has eroded a sense of well-being and security for significant sections of the Indian community. Today, India Gate serves as a symbol of both national renewal and national fragmentation.     

印度对日媾和政策探微

战后印度制定了它的对日媾和政策,其中要求中苏参加和会。这与美国的主张背道而驰。而后,印关间进行反复交涉,最终印度从本国利益和本国外交理念出发,拒绝参加旧金山和会。但它却于会后不久即同日本谈判和约之事。总之印度执行的是一种中间路线。     

In the Shadow of Great Power Politics: Why Nehru Supported PRC's Admission to the Security Council

In early 1950s, India's Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru turned down suggestions that India become a Security Council Permanent Member. As per suggestions, India would either take China's seat occupied by Republic of China (RoC) or become the sixth member alongside RoC. Nehru turned down these overtures arguing that People's Republic of China (PRC) should occupy China's seat at the Security Council. This study ascertains why India turned down apparently good offers and instead championed PRC's cause at a time when there existed marked political differences between them. While some have analyzed India's stand strictly in bilateral terms, this study casts the net wider. By closely examining Nehru's writings and correspondences, it argues that Nehru's support was based on his understanding of PRC and its position as a great power in international relations. Early twentieth-century developments had taught him that great powers that were ostracized became a source of instability. In an era that saw the unveiling of nuclear bombs, the cost of a dissatisfied PRC would be tragic. To stabilize the system, it was necessary to accommodate PRC within the Security Council and provide it with the veto. This would assuage PRC and check its revisionist tendencies.     

论尼赫鲁政府的和平核政策

在先经济后国防的发展战略以及尼赫鲁反核伦理思想的指导下，从1947年8月到1964年5月，尼赫鲁政府奉行和平核政策，坚持和平利用核能，反对发展核武器；鼓吹核裁军，主张全面禁止核试验；着眼经济建设大局，加强核基础设施建设。1962年印度发动对华战争及其惨败，预示着扩张权势、增强防务的努力开始逐步取代经济优先的基本国策，尼赫鲁的反核伦理思想和核权威主义开始动摇，对华战争后关于核问题的公开辩论说明尼赫鲁和平核政策开始受到冲击，印度核政策的变革即将随着尼赫鲁时代的结束而到来。     

Collective Trauma and the Evolution of Nehru's Worldview: Uncovering the Roots of Nehruvian Non-Alignment

ABSTRACT

Scholarship on Nehruvian non-alignment often assumes an artificial continuity between Jawaharlal Nehru's pre-independence thinking and post-independence decision, as India's prime minister, to pursue a policy of rejecting any international blocs or military alliances. This article demonstrates that, in fact, the ideas that constituted Nehruvian non-alignment were largely absent from Nehru's pre-independence thought – during the decades before India's independence Nehru articulated a strong willingness to cede India's sovereignty to international groupings for idealistic aims. To explain Nehru's shift from idealistic internationalist to professed internationalist but de facto isolationist with regard to alliances and blocs, I advocate a first-image, constructivist approach which considers the impact of collective trauma on Nehru's worldview. Drawing upon a novel, synthesized approach to theorizing collective trauma's impact on national identity, this article argues that the collective trauma Nehru witnessed and experienced during the decades before Indian independence profoundly impacted his trust in international institutions and views on representational diplomacy. In turn, this trauma affected his interpretation of various ideational and strategic considerations, contributing to the formulation of Nehruvian non-alignment.     

Feminism and Nationalism in China's War of Resistance against Japan

In November 1959, India's Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, turned seventy. Having led his country since Britain's departure from South Asia in August 1947, Nehru's seventieth birthday stimulated debates, both inside and outside the Indian subcontinent, on India's future in a post-Nehruvian world. In the early 1960s, with the Indian premier's health deteriorating and Sino-Indian relations under strain, British and US policymakers evidenced increasing concern with whom, or perhaps more pertinently, with what, forces would govern the world's largest democracy after Nehru. This article, which draws upon recently released British and US archival records, provides the first assessment of Western involvement in the struggle to succeed Nehru which occurred within India's ruling Congress Party between 1960 and 1964. Moreover, it offers insights into Anglo-American concern that Nehru's health adversely affected Indian policymaking; the involvement of foreign intelligence services in India's domestic politics; and the misplaced expectations of British and US officials that the appointment of Lal Bahadur Shastri as India's second Prime Minister, in May 1964, would herald the beginning of a new and more productive relationship between India and the West.     

试论1949-1951年中国的印度政策与西藏的和平解放

新中国建立前夕 ,美国积极侵略西藏 ,独立后的印度也企图延续它从英国继承的西藏政策和在藏权益 ,西藏地方分裂分子在美印等国的支持下蠢蠢欲动 ,西藏面临更为严峻的形势。以毛泽东为首的中国领导人决定以军事力量为后盾和平解决西藏问题 ,他们精辟地分析了有关国家在西藏问题上的矛盾冲突 ,利用印度维持其在藏利益的政策 ,找出了外交上的突破口 ,在坚决反对其干涉内政的同时争取与之早日建交并修正此前的对印政策 ,有效地制约了美国对西藏的干涉 ,使西藏和平解放顺利实现。