Der Natur‐Begriff des 17. Jahrhunderts und zwei seiner Inter‐pretamente: „res extensa”︁ und „intima rerum”︁

This article aims to show the general and broad use of the concept of nature in the philosophical discourse of the 17th century ‐ and in this context it is obvious that this discourse includes both philosophy and theology. I will discuss two opposite views concerning its fundamental understanding of nature, yet will not go into elaborating differences concerning such particular concepts as, for example, space, void or motion. These views and the theoretical positions from which they emerged will here be called res extensa and intima rerum ‐ this is done in order to clarify the basic opposition: there is no interior in pure extension and there is no extension at all in that what is called the interior. My aim is to show that these two views are, in fact, not quite as incompatible and contradictory as it easily may seem at first glance. Although I will for heuristic purposes introduce the two concepts res extensa and intima rerum as complete opposites and in a wholly contrary manner, ist should become clear that there exist both influences and interactions between these two notions. Theorists introduced here as advocates of the intima rerum‐position, can, for example, be seen as having been influenced by the mechanistic, or res extensa‐position, mainly through the formally and methodologically attractive geometric and mathematical argumentation. Likewise theorists advocating a mechanistic position can be said at some points to have been led by a substantial necessity concerning the contect of their argumentation to take recourse to the concept of intima rerum, at least partly or in a modified manner.     

Rational Mechanics in the Eighteenth Century. On Structural Developments of a Mathematical Science

Rational Mechanics in the Eighteenth Century. On Structural Developments of a Mathematical Science. The role of mathematics in eighteenth‐century science and of eighteenth‐century philosophy of science can hardly be overestimated. However, philosophy of science frequently described and analysed this role in an anachronistic manner by projecting modern points of view about (formal) mathematics and (empirical) science to the past: From today's point of view one might be tempted to say that philosophers and scientists in the seventeenth and even more in the eighteenth century became aware of the importance of mathematics as a means of ‘representing’ physical phenomena or as an ‘instrument’ of deductive explanation and prediction. But such modernisms are missing the central point, i.e. the ‘mathematical nature of nature’ according to mechanical philosophy. Moreover, the understanding of this mathematical nature changed dramatically in the course of the eighteenth century for various (i.e. mathematical, philosophical and other) reasons – a fact hardly appreciated by former philosophical analysis. Philosophy of science today should offer a more accurate analysis to history of science without giving up its task – not always appreciated by historians – to uncover the basic concepts and methods which seem relevant for the understanding of science in question. This paper gives a ‘structural account’ on the development of rational mechanics from Newton to Lagrange that tries to give justice to the fact that rational mechanics in the eighteenth century was primarily understood as a mathematical science and that – starting from this understanding – also tries to give good reasons for the fundamental change of the concept of science that took place during this period.