Introduction

Summary

The Introduction sets the contributions to this special issue in the context of existing scholarship on Dugald Stewart. The main points are the great advance in our understanding of Stewart's intellectual development, his complicated relationship to his predecessors and contemporaries in Scottish philosophy, and his important role in the European republic of letters.     

‘A Local Terrorist Made Good’: the Callaghan government and the Arab–Israeli peace process, 1977–79

The British government had played an important role during the 1950s and 1960s as a mediator in the Arab–Israeli conflict, most notably through the development of Project Alpha between 1954 and 1956, and through the negotiation of United Nations Security Council resolution 242 in 1967. Between 1977 and 1979, British Prime Minister James Callaghan played a supporting role to US President Jimmy Carter as he negotiated the Camp David Accords of 1978. Callaghan adopted a pro-Israeli stance, cultivating close relations with the Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and defending Begin’s position over key issues, particularly his reluctance to remove settlements from the occupied territories. In this respect Callaghan’s government departed from established British policy, even abstaining over United Nations Security Council resolution 446 in March 1979 which condemned continuing Israeli settlement activity. This resulted in damage to Britain’s relations with moderate Arab states such as Egypt and Jordan.     

Between science and religion: The reaction to scientific naturalism in late Victorian England

From its ornamental and often bookish exterior to its use as an exegetical tool for understanding the Book of Nature, the 18th-century microscope was socialized as an instrument of letters as well as of science. This essay proposes a reading of the microscope as a literary artifact by examining its bindings, its texts and its illustrations. While the instrument promised to extend human sense perception and to give its user access to invisible worlds, it simultaneously threatened to alter received views concerning both aesthetics and social hierarchy. Nevertheless, the destabilizing effects of the microscopic message entered polite society cloaked in a veil of familiarity in the binding of a good book. The nostalgia-encrusted instrument absorbed the shock of the new.     

Lead isotope analysis as a new method for identifying material culture belonging to the Vázquez de Coronado expedition

Archaeological evidence has become an increasingly important component of efforts to identify the route of the Francisco Vázquez de Coronado expedition through northern Mexico and the southwestern United States (1540-1542). Here, we report the first high-precision lead isotopic measurements of artifacts from two archaeological sites with strong material evidence for the expedition’s presence: Piedras Marcadas Pueblo in New Mexico and the Jimmy Owens Site in Texas. The analysis of lead and copper armaments from both sites reveals that many artifacts have overlapping or extremely similar isotopic ratios. We propose that the narrow range of lead isotopic ratios measured on these artifacts can be interpreted as a geochemical fingerprint for some of the Coronado expedition’s surviving material culture, and provides evidence that we interpret to suggest the expedition derived lead and copper metal from Mexican sources. Such a geochemical fingerprint presents an empirical method for discriminating between artifacts that belonged to the Coronado expedition and those related to subsequent Spanish, historical, or modern activity in the Southwest U.S. Thus, this method could significantly impact the search for and identification of archaeological sites associated with the Coronado expedition.     

Commercial Liberties and Nuclear Anxieties: The US-German Feud over Brazil, 1975–7

In June 1975, Helmut Schmidt's government in West Germany sanctioned the sale of a complete nuclear fuel cycle to Brazil, including uranium enrichment and reprocessing technology. US observers in Congress, government, and the media reacted with alarm to this apparent setback to global non-proliferation efforts as spearheaded by the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Using material from US, British, and German archives, this article examines how structural disparities in the US-German relationship augmented mutual suspicions and led both parties to behave uncooperatively.

Focused narrowly on commercial rivalry with the US, politicians and industry representatives in Bonn brushed aside the concerns of non-proliferation experts, who had a weak institutional base. Jimmy Carter came to office in 1977 determined to block the consummation of the Brazil deal; he also pressed the G-7 to discontinue nuclear fuel reprocessing. Carter's abrupt unilateralism offended US allies, but together the US and France put pressure on West Germany to renounce sensitive nuclear exports. Schmidt grudgingly agreed to show more caution, but few lessons were learned; many Germans came away feeling that US-led export restrictions were overbearing, hypocritical and self-serving. While cooperative within NATO and European frameworks, West Germans remained ambivalent on global problems of proliferation until the 1990s.     

Helmut Schmidt and the Shaping of Western Security in the Late 1970s: the Guadeloupe Summit of 1979

On 5 and 6 January 1979, US President Jimmy Carter, British Prime Minister James Callaghan, French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, and German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt met on the Caribbean island of Guadeloupe. These secret talks à quatre were intended to be a relaxed frank and free exchange on the current state of global politics, though Western security issues lay at the discussions’ heart. As we now know, it had been Schmidt who, behind the scenes, had been pressing the Carter administration to pursue informal (transatlantic) summitry - the Chancellor's preferred modus operandi. In view of growing Euro-strategic imbalances due to Soviet arms build-up, he sought to achieve political co-ordination among the key North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) players on the theatre-nuclear-forces-modernisation-cum-arms-control issue. Schmidt's pushiness reflected West Germany's new political assertiveness, but also the Chancellor's desire to personally promote national interests in nuclear politics at the top table (similar to his approach as a shaper of international economic and energy policies). This article will explore why this ‘parley at the summit’ mattered, how within this intimate forum Schmidt pursued his goals, what diplomatic tactics and methods he employed, and to what extent he managed to control and shape proceedings and outcomes.     

Changing tides of industrial democracy: Red Clydeside and the UCS work-in as political heritage

ABSTRACT

Drawing on labour history, critical heritage studies and sociological literature on the entrepreneurial city, this article focuses on the cultural legacy of the famous 1971/72 Upper Clyde Shipbuilders (UCS) work-in apropos Glasgow’s historical reputation as ‘Red Clydeside’. In doing so, the article considers the dispute’s continuing importance as a political resource for present-day debates about workers’ rights, Glasgow’s post-industrial identity, the rise of populist demagoguery and the future of Britain’s industry more generally.     

李佳白与尚贤堂--清末民初在华传教士活动个案研究

美国传教士李佳白早期在山东传教,维新时期创办针对上层社会传教的机构“尚贤堂”。从晚清至民国初年,李佳白通过尚贤堂联络中外人士、举办文化活动、宣传和平主张和实行各教联合,曾受到广泛关注。尚贤堂的创立和发展与中国社会的变迁密切相关,反映了20世纪初,在中国社会转型的背景下,在华传教士活动的新变化、新特点以及传教士的活动逐渐淡出中国历史舞台的过程。对这个问题的研究,具有一定的现实意义。     

‘Therefore They Shouldn’t Exist’: The Carter Administration,the ‘Israel Lobby’ and the Sinai Settlements

Abstract

The Israeli settlements in Sinai could have been a fatal obstacle to Egyptian–Israeli peace, but the Jimmy Carter administration overcame it. The established narrative of how Israel ceded the Sinai settlements focuses on the Camp David summit. However, the real battle over the fate of the settlements was fought previously. In February–April 1978, the Carter administration attempted to turn pro-Israeli supporters in the United States against the Israeli position, according to which the Sinai settlements should remain in place. The Menachem Begin government mobilized to counter that push but lost the battle. Contrary to his image as an awkward political operator, Carter won over supporters of Israel effectively. The case raises questions regarding the oft-mentioned role of the ‘Israel lobby’ in preventing peace.