日本学界各流派的日美同盟论争

日美同盟之于日本国家安全与国家大战略的合法性与合理性问题,在冷战后成为日本国是论争的核心。日美同盟的地位与作用、形式与结构、进程与前景的论争,仍是当前日美两国无法回避的课题。本文依据日本学者的日美同盟观与同盟前景的预测,在有限区分几个有代表性的学派或流派的基础上,对日本国内的同盟论争进行了整体性的归纳和梳理,力图通过日本国内的议论揭示出冷战后日美双边同盟面临的困境与问题,从而对日美同盟的维持与变革问题的思索提供一点有益的参考。     

关于中日钓鱼岛争端中"美国因素"的历史考察

文章对中日钓鱼岛争端中的“美国因素”进行了系统考察。二战后美国的日本政策与钓鱼岛问题的产生、发展及变化有着密切联系。在冷战的国际背景下,美国政府通过托管琉球与“第27号令”将中国钓鱼岛纳入其托管之下。20世纪70年代初美国又将钓鱼岛的“施政权”作为冲绳的一部分“归还”给日本,为中日钓鱼岛争端打下“楔子”。冷战结束以来,美国政府在钓鱼岛主权归属上由“模糊中立”到当今小布什政府的“小心介入”,反映了美国政府在钓鱼岛问题立场上的变化。     

从温县盟书谈中国古代盟誓制度

所谓盟誓 ,指人们用言辞共相约束。盟誓的言辞 ,《左传》称之为“载书”。盟与誓有时是有差别的。《礼记·曲礼》说 :“约信曰誓 ,莅牲曰盟。”盟是两个人、两个集团及其以上之间的行为 ,通常采用神秘的仪式。就是说举行盟礼 ,要杀牲歃血以表示神圣与庄重。中国古代对血有所崇拜 ,先民有血祭的习俗 ,牲血被认为有避除邪恶的功能。一件器物新成 ,要涂以牲血叫“衅”。盟誓用口饮血 ,叫“歃血” ,是取信于神的一种仪式。盟多由掌权者主持 ,称为“盟主” ,而且盟是用于加强外交 ,巩固内部秩序的重要手段。誓则常见于军旅主帅誓师、祭祀、诉讼及…     

Asymmetry of power and attention in alliance politics: the US–Republic of Korea case

While power asymmetry typically defines security relationships between allies, there exist other forms of asymmetry that influence alliance politics. In order to illustrate how they can shape policy outcomes that cannot be explained solely through the lens of power capabilities, the authors examine the role of relative attention that each side pays to the alliance. It is their central argument that since the client state has a greater vested interest in the alliance and given that attention depends on interest/need, the client state can leverage attention to get its way. By analysing two specific cases, the 2002 South Korean schoolgirls tragedy and the 2008 beef protests—instances where the South Koreans succeeded in compelling US concessions—the authors show that because the alliance was more central to the client state's agendas, there existed an asymmetry of attention that offered leveraging opportunities for the weaker ally. In this study, the authors emphasise the role of media attention as a key variable, and seek to contribute to debates on weaker party leverage in asymmetrical alliances.     

二战后日美之间的冲绳行政权归还交涉

二战后日本政府一直致力于收复冲绳主权。经过日本历届政府多年的努力,到佐藤政权时期日本终于成功地收回了冲绳施政权,并实现了＂撤出核武器和本土一样＂的归还目标。但日本收回的是对冲绳的行政管理权,美军在冲绳不仅依然保有其军事基地,而且还拥有相当的军事行动自由。为此,日美还专门签订一份保障美军行动自由的秘密协定。冲绳问题的解决对于日美两国来说是一次外交上的双赢。它不仅成功解决了二战后日美之间的领土问题,而且成功实现了日美关系的转换。从此日美关系从日本对美依附走向了日美相互依存。     

片山内阁与日美安全保障体制原型的构筑

尽管片山内阁是一短命的中道政权,但是若从占领时期日本政府构筑安全保障体制的角度而言,则是一不容忽视的时期。在这一时期,片山内阁不仅提出了一系列的媾和对策文件,更重要的是采取行动将日本安全保障方面的设想通过一切可能的渠道向美国方面转达,相继提出了《芦田备忘录》、《铃木备忘录》以及《天皇口信》,形成了后来的日美安全保障体制的原型。     

Gabriel Hanotaux and French Grand Strategy, 1894–8

This article seeks to reappraise the strategic vision of Gabriel Hanotaux, the French Foreign Minister from 1894 to 1898. Most of the scholarship on Hanotaux has focused on his African policies, since shortly after he left office French and British forces engaged in a standoff at Fashoda on the Nile, marking the nadir of pre-war Franco-British relations. This article moves beyond Africa and argues that Hanotaux's foreign policy had a global dimension, particularly apparent in China, and that this is essential to understanding French grand strategy in the period. At the same time, though, Hanotaux's main focus remained European. His interest in the wider world was meant to serve European ends, not least in enabling him to manage the Franco-Russian alliance, France's most important pre-war diplomatic alignment. Hanotaux's political position, though, was weak, and this inhibited the execution of his grand strategy. Moreover, the constraints under which he operated facilitated the continuities that existed between his policy and that of his generally more esteemed successor, Théophile Delcassé.     

From Revolution to Dissolution: The Quai d'Orsay,the Banque Russo-Asiatique,and the Chinese Eastern Railway, 1917–1926

This article explores the use made of Christianity during the Second World War and the dilemmas created for the Allies by Stalin's religious record. It is particularly concerned with the way in which Christianity appeared for a while to become a bridge between East and West, with the explicit promise of continued post-war co-operation. However, in the immediate aftermath of the war, Anglo-American policies in particular switched from using Christianity to rehabilitate the adverse image of the Soviet regime to what had been the inter-war policy of using religion to demonise it. Inter-war demonisation held up the Soviet Union as a model not to be emulated. Post-war demonisation pointed to the Soviet Union as an expansionist threat bent on world domination. The article examines Stalin's responses, and Allied perceptions of those responses, to the changes in Western religious policy and propaganda from the Second World War to the emergence of the cold war. The article seeks to show how both sides used religion for political purposes, but that in the final analysis Western reluctance to relinquish what was perhaps its most emotive means of indicting and containing Communism meant that Christianity, instead of becoming a bridge, became a divisive factor that contributed to both the onset of the cold war and public acceptance of it.     

日本对德结盟述论

尽管日本的对德结盟政策实施于20世纪30、40年代,但日本的对德结盟论出现在19世纪末、20世纪初,它经历了三个阶段。日德同盟的建立经历了准同盟时期和同盟时期。在日德同盟构建前后,从结盟的角度来看,日本存在着另一种结盟构想:利用德国与苏联的关系,调整日本与苏联的关系,如果有可能,缔结日苏同盟,从而进一步缔结更大的日德意苏四国同盟。     

Do nationalist parties shape or follow sub‐national identities? A panel analysis on the rise of the nationalist party in the Flemish Region of Belgium, 2006–11

In this article, we examine the steep and unprecedented rise of the New Flemish Alliance (N‐VA), a Flemish nationalist party in Belgium that succeeded in gaining almost thirty per cent of the vote in a couple of years. During this period, a panel survey among 3,025 late adolescents and young adults was conducted. Our analyses suggest that support for a sub‐nationalist ideology is far more successful in explaining a subsequent vote for the nationalist party than vice versa. In terms of supply and demand mechanisms, we find that N‐VA has managed to address a preexisting reservoir of Flemish nationalist voters (demand), rather than attributing to a development of a stronger Flemish identity among its followers (supply). We should therefore not overestimate the constructionist power of (sub‐)nationalist political elites for the development of (sub‐)nationalist identities.