Wissenschaftsgeschichte mit oder ohne System? Ein methodologischer Rückblick auf das DFG‐Projekt Wissenschaftsgeschichte der Germanistik im 19. Jahrhundert

Among the more recent developments in the historiography of the sciences accounts involving the systems theory by Niklas Luhmann have shown quite prolific in terms of published results and sources. The article investigates the hold of the theoretical grounds of systems theory for the several applications in the field of the history of German literary Scholarship, i. e. the Germanistik, and for this reason expands on the related project conducted by the German Research Society (DFG). In the course of this examination several cruces of theory transfer, especially concerning systems theory towards historiography, will be addressed, such as a deficit in operational application, the essentially ahistoric design of systems theory and its questionable inherent presuppositions on the processes of science.     

“Lachkabinett” und “großes Fest” der Physiker. Walter Grotrians “physikalischer Einakter” zu Max Plancks 80. Geburtstag

“Funhouse” and “Big Celebration” of the Physicists. Walter Grotrian's ?Physical One‐Act Play”? for Max Planck's 80th Birthday. On the occasion of Max Planck's 80th birthday on April 23, 1938, a “big celebration of the physicists” (großes Fest der Physiker) was celebrated at the Harnack‐House in Berlin. The festivities were organized by the German Physical Society. Part of the ceremony was a “Physical One‐act‐play” (Physikalischer Einakter) written by the Potsdam astrophysicist Walter Grotrian. The actors of the humorous play were chief protagonists in the development of quantum theory such as Debye, Sommerfeld and Heisenberg. In this essay we analyze Grotrian's drama against the background of both the festive event and the professional and social setting of the physicists. We argue that below the level of comedy a number of characteristic and normally unexpressed aspects of the epistemic culture of the German physics by the end of the nineteen‐thirties is treated in the play.     

Was zählt der Preis? Dogmengeschichte und Wissensgeschichte der Ökonomie

What’s in a Price? History of Economic Ideologies vs. History of Economic Ideas. This paper suggests applying the approach of a historical epistemology to the field of economics. We observe that an assumedly fundamental opposition between the market and the state dominates popular images of the history of economic ideas. Two conflicting ideologies are roughly assigned to the two opposing sides in the Cold War. To this historical narrative the paper opposes a different view. The argument is that when taking the technical practices of economic knowledge production in the twentieth century into view, similarities abound across ideological ruptures. The chief characteristic change in the recent history of economics was a radical turn towards quantification, measurement, and mathematical modelling. A historical epistemology of economics could show how deeply both, admirers of the state and of the market, share a history. The paper concludes that to-date critique of political economy should also take into consideration a critical perspective towards the unfolding of this measurement revolution in the social sciences.     

Science and the History of the Sciences. Conceptual Innovations Through Historicizing Science in the Eighteenth Century

Science and the History of the Sciences. Conceptual Innovations Through Historicizing Science in the Eighteenth Century. The historical reconstruction of science is linked to philosophical discussions of the eighteenth century in many ways. The historiography of philosophy and the historiography of science share the conceptual problem to assemble the multitude of scientific and philosophical practices under general concepts. The historical analysis of scientific progress offers a clue by problematizing definitions of “science” and “sciences” as well as the system of sciences as a whole. By analyzing these conceptual problems and the typology of historical enterprises of the eighteenth century, this paper will discuss the close interrelations which existed between philosophical and historical discourses of eighteenth‐century reflection on science.     

Rational Mechanics in the Eighteenth Century. On Structural Developments of a Mathematical Science

Rational Mechanics in the Eighteenth Century. On Structural Developments of a Mathematical Science. The role of mathematics in eighteenth‐century science and of eighteenth‐century philosophy of science can hardly be overestimated. However, philosophy of science frequently described and analysed this role in an anachronistic manner by projecting modern points of view about (formal) mathematics and (empirical) science to the past: From today's point of view one might be tempted to say that philosophers and scientists in the seventeenth and even more in the eighteenth century became aware of the importance of mathematics as a means of ‘representing’ physical phenomena or as an ‘instrument’ of deductive explanation and prediction. But such modernisms are missing the central point, i.e. the ‘mathematical nature of nature’ according to mechanical philosophy. Moreover, the understanding of this mathematical nature changed dramatically in the course of the eighteenth century for various (i.e. mathematical, philosophical and other) reasons – a fact hardly appreciated by former philosophical analysis. Philosophy of science today should offer a more accurate analysis to history of science without giving up its task – not always appreciated by historians – to uncover the basic concepts and methods which seem relevant for the understanding of science in question. This paper gives a ‘structural account’ on the development of rational mechanics from Newton to Lagrange that tries to give justice to the fact that rational mechanics in the eighteenth century was primarily understood as a mathematical science and that – starting from this understanding – also tries to give good reasons for the fundamental change of the concept of science that took place during this period.     

Zeitschichten des Klons. Anmerkungen zu einer Begriffsgeschichte

Temporal Layers of the Clone. Remarks on a Conceptual History. This paper aims at a history of the clone concept in 20th‐century life science and culture. The first part of the paper is concerned with conceptual history approaches. Here, the idea of ‘Zeitschichten’ by Reinhart Koselleck is discussed and its implications for the history of science are explored. In the following parts of the paper, I trace the historical dynamics of the clone concept in various fields of 20th‐century life sciences. I argue that the clone concept, which originated in plant breeding around 1900, soon developed into a technical tool in a variety of research areas. With this, specific meanings became attached: the idea of standardization, genetic identity, and mass reproduction. A further connotation of the clone was the idea of stagnancy with respect to processes in time: The clone was seen as something that was exempt from evolutionary changes. In the last section of the paper, I trace the shifting meanings of the clone concept in the 1960s and 1970s, when the clone became a widespread metaphor that pointed to future biotechnologically driven possibilities to reshape the nature of human beings. In this regard, the debates of the 1970s are analyzed as a turning point: Whereas utopian and eugenic visions predominated the debates in the 1960s (when the human clone was seen as something which will occur in a distant future), the 1970s discussion focused on the advent of a biotechnological era and the human clone had became a reality.     

“Fabelhafte Dinge”: Arzneimittelnarrative zu Coca und Cocain im 19. Jahrhundert

“Fabulous Things”. Drug Narratives about Coca and Cocaine in the 19th Century. This contribution focuses on the history of Coca leaves and Cocaine in the second half of 19^th century Europe. Even though, to date, no direct link has been established between the activities of the Milano physician Paolo Mantegazza, and the Göttingen chemist Friedrich Wöhler, it is not a mere coincidence that both published their findings in the same year, namely, 1859. Mantegazza authored the first treatise claiming that Coca had psychoactive qualities and touted its broad therapeutic faculties; he claimed that it should be introduced into European pharmacotherapy. In Wöhler's laboratory, cocaine was isolated from leaves by his pupil Alfred Niemann; later, Wilhelm Lossen refined and corrected Niemann's results. Narratives about medicinal drugs often streamline history into a story that starts with multiple meanings and impure matters and ends with well‐defined substances, directed at clear‐cut diseases and symptoms. In the case of Coca, however, the pure substance triggered no such process well into the 1880s, whereas the leaves continued to circulate as an exotic, pluripotent drug whose effects where miraculous and yet difficult to establish.