《艾登备忘录》与二战末期英国对藏政策

《艾登备忘录》是英国政府1943年制定的对藏政策。其内容延续了英国一贯主张的“宗主权”理论,并以“西藏自治”来要挟中国政府。古德使团依照此政策在拉萨鼓动西藏自治之后,英国外交部又决定反思其西藏政策,但遭到印度政府和印度事务部的反对。从总体来看,无论《艾登备忘录》的提出,还是英国对藏政策的波动,都是出于英国对华总政策的需要。     

War Pessimism in Britain and an American Peace in Early 1916

By offering a reinterpretation of an Anglo-American pact known as the House-Grey Memorandum, this article challenges prevailing views about British decision-making in 1916 in the months leading up to the Battle of the Somme. It argues that serious doubts that the war could still be won without American assistance were the defining characteristic of their deliberations. Owing to deep scepticism about the proposed offensive and severe worries about their financial resources, a majority of the key British civilian leaders were prepared to accept a compromise peace mediated by the United States. Yet these efforts failed primarily because of intrigue at the highest levels of British politics, hard-line Conservative opposition and serious diplomatic missteps by American President Woodrow Wilson. In the end, although doubting it would produce any meaningful results, the British civilian leadership allowed the Somme offensive to go forward only because of their failure to unite on another course of action to prevent it. Finally, this study significantly revises existing thinking about American diplomacy during this period by challenging prevailing notions of the practicality and rigidity demonstrated by U.S. leaders in their foreign policy.     

从“成功行动”计划看美国隐蔽行动的基本模式

美国密谋推翻危地马拉阿本斯政府的"成功行动"计划是冷战时期美国维护后院并遏制国际共产主义的一次重大隐蔽行动;更为重要的是,以"9·11备忘录"为政策指南的"成功行动"计划奠定了美国隐蔽行动模式的基础,而支持性官方压力、隐蔽宣传战和心理战以及辅助性军事行动则构成为美国隐蔽行动的三个基本环节。