IN SEARCH OF NEW TIMES: TEMPORALITY IN THE ENLIGHTENMENT AND COUNTER‐ENLIGHTENMENT

Isaiah Berlin and other representatives of historicism have made the Enlightenment and the Counter‐Enlightenment into opposite cultures. The Counter‐Enlightenment is a criticism of the Enlightenment from within, so in many respects they overlap. However, with regard to perceptions of time they contradict each other. The times of the Enlightenment lean heavily toward chronology and can be labeled as “empty,” whereas the time perceptions of the Counter‐Enlightenment can be called “incarnated” and are identical with historical times. As a consequence the differences between the two temporalities lead necessarily to differences in synchronization.     

“The Power to Empty Oneself”: Hegel,Kenosis, and Intellectual Virtue

This article considers Hegel's idea of Entäußerung, or kenosis, as a model for an intellectual virtue that enables people to confront difference and disagreement without domination. According to Hegel, Entäußerung involves a refusal to use one's epistemic status – of being one among many reciprocally recognized loci of authority – as a basis for dominating others. The article considers the development of this idea in Hegel's work, addresses affinities between Hegel's idea of Entäußerung and recent feminist theology, and suggests its relevance for thinking about political and ethical conflict.     

Hegel,Analytic Philosophy’s Pharmakon

In this article I argue that Hegel has become analytic philosophy’s “pharmakon”—both its “poison” and its “cure.” Traditionally, Hegel’s philosophy has been attacked by Anglo-American analytical philosophers for its alleged charlatanism and irrelevance. Yet starting from the 1970s there has been a revival of interest in Hegel’s philosophical work, which, I suggest, may be explained by three developments: (1) the revival of interest in Aristotelianism following Saul Kripke’s and Hilary Putnam’s work on natural kinds, and Elizabeth Anscombe’s, Philippa Foot’s, and Putnam’s opposition to the fact-value distinction; (2) the rehabilitation of Hegel’s theories by various philosophers, including Robert Pippin, Terry Pinkard, Fred Beiser, Robert Stern, and Stephen Houlgate; and (3) the Sellars-inspired philosophy of mind of John McDowell and of Robert Brandom. The first and third of these reasons, I argue, have led several analytic theorists to cast Hegel in a more positive light as the “cure” for analytic philosophy. The combined outcome of these changes, both ironic and fitting, is that the Hegelian principle of internal critique has played a significant role not only in analytic philosophy’s rapprochement with Hegel’s philosophy but also in overcoming the Analytic-Continental philosophical divide.     

A Negative Geography of Necessity

Abstract: One of the many unfortunate results of the long‐lived misconception that Marx was a “determinist” is a lack of engagement with his ideas of necessity and negation. Reading the Grundrisse's famous comments on the annihilation of space by time, I trace the Hegelian roots of these concepts to show that for both Marx ahd Hegel, negation is the very act of critique itself, and necessity is properly understood not as the force of history, but as the object of historical explanation–what makes things the way they are and not another. It is therefore crucial to critical geography's efforts to identify the possibilities for social change, for that analysis must be predicated on an understanding for how things have emerged in their present form, i.e. the one we have to work with. I argue that a negative geography of necessity is the essential basis for anything we might call a communist geography, a geography of “the real movement which abolishes the present state of things”.     

SCHOPENHAUER'S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

Contained mostly within one brief chapter of his The World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer's philosophy of history has long been considered either hostile or irrelevant to nineteenth‐century philosophy of history. This article argues that, on the contrary, Schopenhauer maintained what would become a widely accepted criticism of the methodological identity of historiography and the natural sciences. His criticism of Hegel's teleological historiography was more philosophically rigorous than is commonly acknowledged. And his proposal of a “genuine” historiography along the model of art became a major influence on the historiography of Burckhardt, Emerson, and Nietzsche. This article accordingly aims to restore Schopenhauer to the conversation of nineteenth‐century philosophy of history.     

In the Shadow of Gillian Rose: Truth as Education in the Hegelian Philosophy of Rowan Williams

Rowan Williams, ex-Archbishop of Canterbury (2002–2012), is a polymath of remarkable breadth and depth. But there remains at least one area in which his philosophical work has gone relatively unacknowledged and that is his view of education. My aim here is to explore a philosophically nuanced notion of truth as education in his work by examining its indebtedness to Hegel, and the recent Hegelianism of Gillian Rose. I argue that not only does a radical re-reading of the negative by Williams shape a formidable social and political critique but that therein the question of the Absolute is renewed in and for our time as one of learning.     

The rise of the ethical state in Italy. Neapolitan Hegelians and Risorgimento political thought (1848–1871)

ABSTRACT

The article examines the idea of the Ethical State in Italy within the context of the Risorgimento and of Neapolitan Hegelianism. The article first analyses the Neapolitan Hegelians’ idea of nationality and its relationship to the concept of “national character”. Then it focuses on the differences between Hegel’s and Spaventa’s concepts of the State. Finally, it places Silvio and Bertrando Spaventa’s liberalism within Risorgimento debates after 1848, pointing to differences with moderate liberals such as Cesare Balbo or Vincenzo Gioberti. By delineating the context of ideas such as nationality, national character, ethics, and the state, the article sheds new light on the relationship between liberalism and nationalism in nineteenth-century European political thought.     

Alexis de Tocqueville: Selected letters on politics and society

This article reflects on the relationship between historical writing and enquiry and philosophy, and more particularly the manner in which the pursuit of a particular natural philosophy can influence historical narratives. The article begins with a comparison of Roman and Greek approaches to history, employing a distinction between narrative and logic. It goes on to consider the impact of Christianity, the relationship between enlightenment narratives and philosophical developments regarding the nature of causation, and the Hegel/Marx critique of the kinds of empiricism associated with Hume. The article ends by considering the counterfactual historical analysis and the proper relationship between history and philosophy for modern historians.     

Samuel Taylor Coleridge on ideas actualized in history

ABSTRACT

Situating Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s thought on historically actualized ideas with reference to a range of classical thinkers, this article examines his intriguing philosophical theory about how ideas become progressively actualized in history. This cultural growth can be understood as contemplation-in-action, although it occurs through mainly fumbling – or else overenthusiastic – human agents. I distinguish Coleridgean first-order, transcendent ideas (such as God, infinity, the good, the soul) from second-order, historical ones (such as church, state, the constitution). It has been argued that Coleridge’s theory of ideas develops from Bacon’s inductive method for discovering laws of nature through experiment and natural law through common law. I further claim that Coleridge upholds the reality of “Forms” in science, and of rights in ethics and politics; that his later political thought is inherently more progressive than is generally admitted; and that his account differs from Schelling’s and Hegel’s respective theories by maintaining the transcendence of ideas above the immanence of their evolving historical actualizations. Coleridge’s philosophy is therefore, whether political or metaphysical, ultimately an ontological defence of the transcendence of ideas above the immanence of their progressive but imperfect actualization.