„Siege der Freiheit,welche die Menschen durch die Erforschung des Grundes der Dinge errangen”︁ Wandlungen im politischen Selbstverständnis deutscher Naturwissenschaftler des 19. Jahrhunderts

“Victories of Freedom which Humans Achieved by Research in the Foundation of Things”. - This article analyzes the political self-conception of leading representatives of the natural sciences in 19th century Germany. It is argued that the main feature of this self-conception which remained constant over the time consisted in a strong “rationalization-imperative”, i.e. the postulate that state and society have to be reshaped on the basis of natural science. On the other hand, this imperative was put forward in very different forms and with different political content: it shifted from revolutionary aspirations in the period of 1848 to moderate and sometimes even reactionary positions in the last decades of the century.     

Dualistische Entwürfe zur Einheit der Naturphänomene und die Anfänge der Romantischen Naturphilosophie

The importance of German Naturphilosophie for the development of a unified view of nature is often emphasized. The search for ultimate unity of natural phenomena, however, was already too common among physicists of the waning 18th century to ascribe its popularity to the influence of philosophers. To avoid the plethora of imponderable fluids, many ?atomists”? reduced electric, magnetic, thermal, and chemical phenomena to a dualism of contrary principles, thereby prefiguring the ?dynamic”? ideas of romantic Naturphilosophen. In particular we show how Schelling's early account of his Naturphilosophie was shaped by J. A. Deluc's atomistic theory of gases and vapours.     

Erfahrung und Vorurteil im naturwissenschaftlichen Denken Johannes Keplers

The change from ancient and medieval to modern natural science, called Wende (instead of ‘revolution’), must be associated with the work of Johannes Kepler and not that of Nicolaus Copernicus. Copernicus merely showed the way, introducing heliocentricity as the order of the planets. This Wende resulted from the synthesis of several disciplines formerly isolated from each other, namely mathematical (i.e. hypothetical) astronomy, new physics, mathematical harmony, astrology, new physical optics, and natural theology. Whereas Copernicus united mathematical astronomy and peripatetic (Aristotelian) physics, Kepler was first to see the necessity for providing a physical explanation and an ontological foundation to the heliocentric system. He was the first to consider and measure the movement of the planets in depth. The elements for his new physics Kepler obtained not from newly observed data, but from a harmonic archetypus of the regular polyhedra fitted in between excentric planetary spheres. On the basis of this archetypus (which he considered to be God's model in creating the universe) he accepted the new heliocentric planetary system as a physical reality. That is why astronomy, by way of taking into account stereometric quantities, is, in Kepler's eyes, a kind of divine worship. Later, the best empirical data had also to be taken into consideration as a means of proving this a priori archetypus (Vorurteil, preconception). The result was, on the one hand, a universal natural science able to explain natural processes in grater abundance than ever before or since in the history of science. Although accepted only in parts, it resulted in founding a new natural science with adherent mathematical and empirical methods. It also led Kepler to establish, step by step, the elliptical path of the planets, thereby overcoming, for the first time, the two axioms of ancient astronomy, requiring uniform and circular planetary motion. It has been shown that this Keplerian Wende was possible only within the Historischen Erfahrungsraum (‘historical field of experience’) of Renaissance Humanism (cf. this Journal 9/1986, p. 201), which came about itself as the result of reactivating the scientific and philosophical thinking of the ancient Greeks and was accomplished by three steps (phases) relating to the revival of (1) original ancient writings, (2) the ancient knowledge of natural facts and data, and (3) the ancient scientific and philosophical ideas and mentalities (Drei-Phasen-Modell).     

Two Careers across Two Cultures

Beginning with my recollection of hearing C. P. Snow's ‘Two Cultures’ lecture, I sketch my experience of building two academic careers in succession, first in one of the natural sciences and later in the history of such sciences. I outline both the difficulties and the rewards that I encountered in crossing the alleged gulf between the sciences and the humanities, but also emphasise the diversity of cultures that I experienced within each. I describe my own encounter with the academic culture of continental Europe, within which the concept of a monolithic singular ‘Science’ could be dismissed as an ‘anglophone heresy’, and viewed from which the Two Cultures debate could seem both provincial and redundant.     

„On employera les meilleurs Graveurs pour les Figures”︁. Zeichner und Stecher der Berliner Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1700–1806

“We will employ the best engravers for the figures” – Draughtsmen and Engravers of the Berlin Academy of Sciences, 1700–1809. – Although barely mentioned in accounts of its history of the Berlin Academy of Sciences, draughtsmen and engravers were, from the very inception, essential collaborators. Based on previously overlooked archival sources, this paper investigates the strategies that scientists used to select the most appropriate candidates during the first hundred years of the academy's existence. These included: (1) the engaging of artists already known to the scientists or those who had been recommendaded to them; (2) maintaining long‐term relationships with a number of artists, and later with their offspring (who had frequently been trained by their fathers); in 1768 this strategy culminated in the creation of a permanent position for one academic draughtsman; and (3) hiring draughtsmen who specialised in the subject matter in question, which entailed, for example, employing different people to carry out anatomical and botanical illustrations.     

Science and the History of the Sciences. Conceptual Innovations Through Historicizing Science in the Eighteenth Century

Science and the History of the Sciences. Conceptual Innovations Through Historicizing Science in the Eighteenth Century. The historical reconstruction of science is linked to philosophical discussions of the eighteenth century in many ways. The historiography of philosophy and the historiography of science share the conceptual problem to assemble the multitude of scientific and philosophical practices under general concepts. The historical analysis of scientific progress offers a clue by problematizing definitions of “science” and “sciences” as well as the system of sciences as a whole. By analyzing these conceptual problems and the typology of historical enterprises of the eighteenth century, this paper will discuss the close interrelations which existed between philosophical and historical discourses of eighteenth‐century reflection on science.     

Vielfalt der Wissenschaften bei Carnap,Lewin und Fleck. Zur Entwicklung eines pluralen Wissenschaftskonzepts

The Diversity of Science in Carnap's, Lewin's and Fleck's Philosophy: Toward a Pluralistic Point of View. In the 1920s and 1930s three different but simultaneous approaches of philosophy of science can be distinguished: the logical approach of the physicist Rudolf Carnap, the logico‐historical approach of the psychologist Kurt Lewin and the socio‐historical approach of the medical scientist Ludwik Fleck. While the philosophies of Lewin and Fleck can be characterized as contextual appraisals which account for the interactions between particular sciences and their historical, socio‐cultural or intellectual environments, Carnap's philosophy is narrowed to an internal methodology centered on scientific propositions and logical structures in general. In addition to these differences in aim and practice of methodological analysis the estimation of the real disunity and diversity of the special branches of science differs. Instead of Carnap's ideal of a unified science from the new pluralistic point of view the evaluation of the empirical multiplicity of particular sciences obtains philosophical acceptance.