略论杜勒斯对苏战略的早期思想背景（1919—1952）

杜勒斯的对苏战略构想和政策主张与其早期经历和思想有着密切的关联。杜勒斯对苏战略观的政治哲学基础是他早年形成的“和平变革”论,其思想根源包括在冷战初期即已基本定型的苏联观,即他对苏联“挑战”的性质、对外目标与手段、战略上的优势和弱点等问题的基本判断。联系这个思想背景,可以从杜勒斯令人目眩的多种表象背后,看到一条清晰而又前后连贯的政策思路。可以说,杜勒斯的对苏战略构想就其本质而言是一以贯之的,其逻辑顺序可以概括为“共处—竞争—高压—变革”。     

Israeli Intelligence and the leakage of Khrushchev's “Secret Speech”

Khrushchev's “Secret Speech” of 1956 not only marked a major radical change in the USSR, but when it was published outside the USSR it brought upheaval all over the world. According to conventional knowledge the text of the speech was obtained by the Mossad (the Israeli foreign-intelligence organization) and transmitted to the CIA. A critical examination of the published evidence and accounts contradicts this version and suggests a number of points: the Secret Speech was not secret; Israel was not the single and perhaps not the first source for the text to reach the West; the speech was intended by Khrushchev and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to be disseminated to all communist parties around the world; and it was covertly brought to the knowledge of Western intelligence organizations and the world press by Soviet political and intelligence agencies.     

20世纪50年代美国政府关于核报复战略的内部争论

研究“核威慑”这一军事理念正式形成的50年代美国核战略的决策史,有助于认识今天再度得到强化的美国核战略态势。有关档案献显示,在军事战略领域首次正式将威慑理论付诸实践的艾森豪威尔政府,在“新面貌”战略特别是其中的“大规模报复战略”的具体实施问题上,一直存在严重分歧并为此展开了持久的争论。这既是出于对美苏核军备竞赛所加剧的全面战争危险和美苏可能最终形成战略均势的深切担忧,也是因为该战略在扼阻地区冲突方面的明显局限性。但由于对外部威胁的基本判断没有改变,加上现行战略的内在矛盾,艾森豪威尔政府始终无法彻底改弦更张,只能作一些局部的修补,因而未能摆脱战略上的困境。