Essay and Reflection: On the Nature of International History

This essay focuses on a previously under-explored facet of Churchill's life by analysing the autobiographical novel he created while reading literary classics as a young soldier suffering bouts of depression in a remote corner of the British Empire. It employs a combination of research strategies that include Churchill's correspondence, extracts from Savrola and related works, the social-scientific insights of Anthony Storr and Daniel Levinson, and an unpublished document in the Churchill Archives that links Churchill's capacity for heroism to the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer. The author concludes that Savrola provided a means of self-diagnosis and treatment for Winston Churchill to extract some meaning in life and ultimately achieve political success.     

‘Continuous abuse’ or ‘a unanimous blessing’? Reassessing the Conservative Party’s stance on the 1951 Festival of Britain

The 1951 Festival of Britain has long been seen as both a key turning point in the country’s post-war history and an event which was delivered, by Clement Attlee’s Labour Government, in the face of formidable political (and media) opposition. This article considers the Festival’s status as a pivotal moment in modern British history but focuses primarily on the Conservative Party’s approach to the project. In doing so, its draws on previously neglected evidence to suggest that successive works on the subject have greatly exaggerated the extent to which the festivities were the subject of partisan campaigning and political contention.     

Herzl and the Palestinian Arabs: Myth and Counter-Myth

According to conventional Zionist historiography, Herzl thought little about Arabs, and what he did have to say about them reflected benign and progressive, albeit paternalistic, sentiment. Critics of Zionism, on the other hand, claim that underlying the paucity of Herzl's comments on Arabs was a conspiracy of silence, for already in 1895 he was allegedly planning the expulsion of the Palestinians, although he only confided this dark scheme to his diary. This essay throws new light upon Herzl's attitudes towards Palestine's Arabs. It explores a variety of historiographical questions raised by the gulf that separates the camps of scholars who have written on this subject, and it critiques the way that historians have read Herzl's diary and privileged it over his other writings.     

Diehard Conservatism,Mass Democracy,and Indian Constitutional Reform,c.1918–35

This article explores the Conservative Party crisis over India to examine the relationship between diehard Conservatives and Britain's emerging democracy. Far from rejecting democracy outright, diehard rhetoric and mass communication demonstrates how they adapted to it and utilised it in pursuit of their objectives. The accommodation of diehard Conservatism within the Conservative Party was a necessary and mutual embrace. Contrary to popular image, it promoted Conservative unity and contributed to the party's remarkable electoral success. Unable to exact decisive victories, the capacity of diehard Conservatives to generate party crises over imperial questions, among grass‐roots and back‐bench Conservatives, ensured that they had a role in shaping the presentation and content of party policy. This had implications for leadership efforts to liberalise the party, and also popular perceptions of British imperialism and the feasibility of democracy in India.     

‘Imago Mundi’ bibliography (of literature mainly published in 1985–87)

The History of Cartography, Volume 1: Cartography in Prehistoric, Ancient and Medieval Europe and the Mediterranean. Edited by J. B. Harley and David Woodward. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1987. Pp. xxii + 599, 40 colour plates. US$100.00

Kartographische Quellen Welt‐, See‐ und Regionalkarten by Anna‐Dorothee von den Brincken. Typologie des Sources du Moyen Âge Occidental, fasc. 51. Turn‐hout: Brepols (for Université Catholique de Louvain, Institut d'Études Médiévales), 1988. Pp. 117, plates.

Chizu no Shiwa: Creases of Map or Essays on the History of Cartography by Kazutaka Unno. Tokyo: Yūshōdō Press, 1985. 4 8419 0009 8. Pp. xii+338, illustrations. Yen 3500.

Maps and Plans for the Local Historian and Collector by David Smith. London: Batsford, 1988. 0 7134 5191 2. Pp. 240, illustrations. £19.95.

Maps for Local History by Paul Hindle. London: Batsford, 1988. Batsford Local History Series. 0 7134 5583 7. Pp. 160, illustrations. £14.95.

American Maps and Mapmakers: Commercial Cartography in the Nineteenth Century by Walter W. Ristow. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1985.08143 17685. Pp. 488, illustrations. $60.00.

Atlas of Great Lakes Indian History edited by Helen Hornbeck Tanner. The Civilisation of the American Indian Series 174. Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press (for The Newberry Library), 1987. 0 8061 1515 7 (cloth)/0 8061 2056 8 (paper). Pp. xv+224, illustrations, maps. $29.95.

Cartographic Innovations: An international handbook of mapping terms to 1900 edited by Helen M. Wallis and Arthur H. Robinson. Tring: Map Collector Publications, 1987. Pp. xx + 353, illustrations. £47.     

Sentiment vs Strategy: British Naval Policy,Imperial Defence,and the Development of Dominion Navies, 1911–14

This article examines British naval policy towards imperial defence and the development of autonomous Dominion navies in 1911–14. It shows that the Admiralty's main goal under the leadership of Winston Churchill was to concentrate British and Dominion warships in European waters, and ideally in the North Sea, to meet the German threat. Churchill's approach to naval developments in the Dominions was also shaped by his desire to fulfil the Cabinet's policy of remaining strong in the Mediterranean Sea. He made some concessions to sentiment in the Dominions, but his attempts to create a coherent imperial policy for the naval defence of Britain and its empire were ultimately unsuccessful. By 1914 it was clear that the Dominions would not provide the additional warships Britain required for the Mediterranean, and on the eve of war the Admiralty was beginning to prepare an imperial naval strategy that more accurately reflected the Empire's capabilities.     

Zionism and Palestine in anti‐Semitic thought in imperial Germany

Britain honored its international commitment under the Balfour Declaration for the duration of the 1920s in order to retain control of Palestine – a strategic buffer to the Suez Canal. The import of Jewish capital and revenues from Zionist enterprise and commerce in Palestine enabled it to do so. Not only was Britain able to administer Palestine at a minimal cost to the British taxpayer, but it also used Zionist-generated capital to finance its own imperial projects in the region: the construction of Haifa harbor, and an oil pipeline and road from Baghdad to Haifa.     

Churchill's ‘Iron Curtain’ Speech in Context: The Attempt to Achieve a ‘Good Understanding on All Points’ with Stalin's Soviet Union

More than 70 years ago, on 5 March 1946, former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill delivered his ‘iron curtain’ speech at Westminster College in Fulton. The speech immediately attracted worldwide attention and proved to be highly controversial. Most contemporaries in East and West and the vast majority of subsequent historians interpreted the speech as Churchill's call for western resistance to Stalin's expansionist policies and the continuation of the wartime ‘special relationship’ between Washington and London. This article argues, however, that Churchill's speech has been misunderstood. When set in the context of Churchill's other pronouncements on world affairs during his time as leader of the opposition between 1945 and 1951 and in view of his vigorously pursued ‘Big Three’ ‘summit diplomacy’ with Moscow and Washington after he returned as Prime Minister in 1951, the ‘iron curtain’ speech must be seen in a different light. It becomes clear that this famous speech was not Churchill's sabre-rattling call for commencing or energizing the East--West conflict with the Soviet Union. Quite to the contrary, his speech was meant to prevent the escalation of this conflict and avoid the dangerous clash between the world's greatest powers that soon became known as the Cold War.     

The Lost Leader: Sir Stafford Northcote and the Leadership of the Conservative Party, 1876–85*

Sir Stafford Northcote has gone down in history as a man who fell short of the ultimate achievement of being prime minister largely because of personal weakness, and lack of political virility and drive. The picture painted by Northcote's political enemies – most notably the Fourth Party – has been accepted uncritically. Yet, political motives lay behind the actions of these supporters, and their harsh black and white portrait is not illustrative of the complexity of the situation in which Northcote found himself. Although individual characteristics undoubtedly played a part in his final political failure, underlying dynamics and structural transformations in politics and political life were more significant. It was more than simply the misfortune in succeeding the exceptionally charismatic Disraeli as leader. Northcote was faced with unparalleled disruption in parliament from Irish Nationalist MPs; the starkly polarised debate on the eastern question left him detached as a moderate. His temperament was better suited to constructive government rather than to opposition. However, following general election defeat in 1880, Northcote was denied this opportunity. Equally, his position in the lower House denied him the capacity to define a clear political critique of the Liberal government. Northcote's leadership of the party reflected the changing nature of British politics as radicals, tories, Irish Nationalists and Unionists increasingly contested the consensual style more appropriate to the political world of Palmerston and the 14th earl of Derby.     

The Historiography of Deir Yassin

This article describes Israeli and Arab historiography concerning the events in the Arab village of Deir Yassin in April 1948, during the first Israeli–Arab war, of 1948. It begins with the internal, left–right Israeli controversy during 1969–71 about the alleged massacre and then describes and analyses what “really” happened at Deir Yassin on the basis of the Israeli (and, to a smaller extent, British) documentation from 1948 that has been declassified over the last few years. It then concludes by describing the evolution of the Israel and Palestinian histographical narratives on the event.