蒋经国留学苏联述论

蒋经国在留学苏联期间,受到苏共和斯大林的重视,被吸收为苏共党员并送入高级军事院校深造,其命运随中国革命形势和中苏关系的变化而动荡起伏,他留苏12载,深入苏联政治和社会生活,历经肃托、农业集体化、肃反等各种运动,目睹苏联的种种弊端,对苏联从向往到怀疑,最终彻底背离。苏联通过蒋经国影响蒋介石,使中苏关系形成有利于苏联态势的期冀最终没有实现。     

鲁斯扶蒋原因探析

在现代中美关系史中,美国“新闻大王”鲁斯以“扶蒋反共”著称。从1936年起,在30余年的时间里,鲁斯通过其掌握的《时代》周刊、《生活》画报、《财富》杂志等媒体,将蒋介石描述为“坚强”、“民主”的中国领袖和领导中国走向美国式现代化的基督战士,力图通过操纵公众舆论,影响美国对华政策。鲁斯扶助蒋介石,与其所处的时代和出生于中国的身世背景密切相关。从表面上看,其目的是为中国寻求现代化发展之路,实现美国化中国的梦想;而在更深的层面上,则是为实现“美国世纪”构想而采取的重要步骤,表现出强烈的“美国至上”的倾向。     

评蒋介石研究

蒋介石是民国政治舞台上的一个关键人物,是中国国民党历史上的中心人物。中国大陆对蒋介石的研究缘起于20世纪60年代,自80年代以来,拓宽了研究领域,在多方面取得了令人欣慰的成果。同时,由于多种原因,在蒋介石研究领域里也出现了一些偏差与不足。     

Democracy and national destinies on Taiwan

In the case of Taiwan, experts have debated whether passionate national loyalties (Taiwanese or Chinese) facilitated or stymied democratization. This paper argues that nationalism facilitated political change in Taiwan. In fact, democratization during the 1980s and the 1990s was spurred in part by the pursuit of two conflicting national destinies. The Chinese Nationalist Party legitimized reform as the end of a century‐long process for the reconstruction of the Chinese nation. To many Nationalists, particularly those born on the mainland, Taiwan was the fulfilment of Sun Yat‐sen's vision of China known as the Three Principles of the People. At the same time, many opponents of the regime saw successful reform as one step towards the realization of a Taiwanese nation. Dominated by those who identified themselves as Taiwanese, generally those of Chinese descent whose ancestors had lived on Taiwan prior to 1945, these activists hoped to take power through the ballot box, then implement a series of policies to strengthen an island‐wide identity.     

中美关系史上一件"谜案"的历史考察 --"罗斯福下令史迪威除掉蒋介石之说"辨析

近年来,开罗会议期间罗斯福指令史迪威清除蒋介石的说法出现于国内许多论著中.本文从罗斯福对华政策、开罗会议期间罗斯福与蒋介石关系、美在华中国通对蒋介石的态度等方面对这一说法进行了辨析,指出开罗会议期间罗斯福指令史迪威干掉蒋介石的说法纯属子虚乌有.     

澄清九一八事变时不抵抗方针研究的误区

长期以来大陆通行一种说法 :九一八事变时 ,东北军对日本关东军的进攻未予抵抗 ,是张学良“忍痛执行”蒋介石的不抵抗主义命令 ,使他蒙上“不抵抗将军”骂名 ,做了蒋的“替罪羔羊”。研究中存在一些误区 ,需要澄清。 1 .蒋介石、张学良之间并非简单的上下级关系 ,张学良具有相当的独立性 ,他与蒋的意见不同时 ,对蒋的命令可以不听 ,防守锦州问题即是如此。 2 .这一观点主要靠一些回忆录作依据 ,而许多回忆资料的说法存在种种漏洞。 3.事变前中国一方对日军挑衅采取“力避冲突”方针 ,对此蒋张二人具有共识。事变前蒋氏指示对日军挑衅采取“力避冲突”方针 ,对事变后张学良实行不抵抗政策不无影响 ,但事变前“力避冲突”与事变发生后“不抵抗”方针 ,二者有明显区别。 4 .事变发生后 ,张学良和荣臻等人的电文均证明 ,是张学良对东北军下了不抵抗命令。 5 .九一八事变发生后 ,蒋介石和国民政府处置事变的方针 ,并非可以简单地归结为不抵抗政策。国民政府对事变的处置是 ,诉诸国联 ,并准备抵抗。四个月后就发生了一·二八淞沪抗战 ,采取的是“一面抵抗 ,一面交涉”方针。 6 .张学良晚年一再说过 ,下不抵抗命令的 ,是他自己 ,而不是中央政府     

司徒雷登与战后中国的"新革命运动"

战后中国的"新革命运动"是由司徒雷登发起的,其目的是通过国民党政府内部的改革,把CC系的势力排除出去,让自由主义势力进入政府并掌握政权,以维持国民党政权的统治,对抗中国共产党领导的革命运动.由于"新革命运动"是建立在错误的基础之上,司徒雷登试图通过"新革命运动"挽救国民党统治的努力最终失败.     

Soviet–Japanese relations and the strategic interests of the Guomindang and the CCP – Chiang Kai‐shek's planning of sanctions against the CCP in 1943

When in 1943 the Guomindang launched its third wave of anti‐communist campaigns, Mao Zedong considered that Chiang Kai‐shek had acted in the belief that Japan would soon invade the Soviet Union. Hitherto, Chinese historians have either ignored Mao's judgment or failed to provide convincing explanations for it. There are two reasons for this attitude: first, historians have failed to appreciate the strategic implications of the relationship between the Soviet Union and Japan for relations between the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP); and second, relevant evidence regarding the events has not been available in document on Chiang. This essay answers questions raised by both points. Most commentators have claimed that this third anti‐Communist push ended by the middle or late July of 1943. However, Chiang in fact continued to make plans to mop up Shaanbei (the Communist‐controlled northern Shaanxi area) and impose sanctions on the Communists. The formulation, revision and eventual abandonment of Chiang's plans are also addressed in this essay.     

The re-examination of Chiang Kai-shek's returning virtue for malice policy towards Japan after the victory of the Anti-Japanese War

After victory in the Anti-Japanese War, Chiang Kai-shek issued the famous radio speech “Letter to Soldiers and Civilians of the Whole Nation as well as the Peoples of the World after the Victory of the Anti-Japanese War.” The main idea of this speech was long interpreted as “returning virtue for malice” (or “good for evil”), a basic principle of the Kuomintang's policy towards Japan. Many scholars who have considered the returning virtue for malice policy in the postwar period include the following major issues: first, China repatriated Japanese prisoners of war and the Japanese diaspora with mercy; second, China allowed the Tenno, or imperial, system to be preserved in Japan; third, China did not participate in the occupation of Japan; and fourth, China gave up the right to ask for war reparations from Japan. This article examines the above four issues to reevaluate the returning virtue for malice policy. The first issue seems to reflect the Chinese national character of being lenient with others. However, it was in fact due to Chiang's anti-Communist strategy and the declared policy of the United States of eradicating Japan's influence in China. With regard to the second issue, Chiang's attitude was merely to let the Japanese people make their own choice, while the fate of the Japanese Tenno system was entirely determined by the US occupation authority, on which Chiang had little influence. The third issue was mainly the outcome of Chiang's focus on domestic political struggle in the postwar era in China. As for war reparations, China actually made efforts to obtain them in the beginning, but had to give up its right eventually. The decision-making process in the Kuomintang government was restrained by American policy and subordinated to Japanese pressure. Thus, it is not persuasive to summarize the basic principle of Kuomintang postwar policy towards Japan as returning virtue for malice.     

The return of Xinjiang to Chinese central control during the late period of the Sino–Japanese War: a reappraisal based on Chiang Kai-shek's Diary

After the outbreak of the Pacific War, while considering taking back the Japanese-occupied areas, the Nationalist government also started to think of recovering the frontier regions, which had been somewhat out of China's control under the influence of a major ally of China, the USSR. For a long time, Xinjiang had a very close relationship with the Soviet Union under the rule of Sheng Shicai, and the central government of China had little direct control. In April of 1942, Sheng Shicai, suspicious of a Soviet conspiracy to overthrow his rule, conducted mass arrests in Xinjiang, causing a sudden deterioration in the relationship between Xinjiang and the Soviets. At first, the Soviet Union attempted to intimidate Sheng in order to prevent him from turning to the central government, but failed. Paying no heed to the alienation policy of the Soviets, the Nationalist government soon decided to buttress Sheng in an effort to place Xinjiang under centralized control. The Nationalist government first set out to take back the diplomacy of Xinjiang, followed by expropriation of formerly Soviet-controlled enterprises and forced removal of Soviet military advisors, experts, technicians and army personnel from Xinjiang. In the meantime, a large number of party, government, economic, cultural and educational personnel were dispatched by the central government to Xinjiang to infiltrate various sectors. With the weakening of his own power and increasing conflicts with the central government, Sheng Shicai planned another turn of events. By executing a new round-up, this time to cleanse Xinjiang of the central government's forces, Sheng re-oriented his regime towards the Soviet Union. Yet his gesture was turned down by the USSR because of his loss of credibility. Well prepared militarily, the Nationalist government eventually forced Sheng Shicai to leave Xinjiang, which then was almost fully restored to the authority of the central government.